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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine another terrorist strike on United States soil similar 
to the events of September 11, 2001. Within days, Congress considers 
amending federal law to specify that under defined conditions in the 
wake of a terrorist attack, the United States military would have 
exclusive authority to maintain law and order within the affected 
area.1 Members of Congress, however, take pause at the Supreme 
Court’s previous admonitions that criminal law enforcement is a 
traditional subject of state concern in our federal system. They 
therefore decide not to replace state and local law enforcement 
personnel with the military. Instead, they put state and local officers 
under federal command (with federal pay) for the duration of the 
emergency conditions. 
Under the Rehnquist Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
Congress would not have this option; the authorizing legislation would 
clearly fall within the Court’s categorical ban on “commandeering” 
state and local officials. “Commandeering” refers to a federal 
requirement that state officials enact, administer, or enforce a federal 
regulatory program. Under the same Tenth Amendment decisions, 
however, there would be no constitutional impediment were Congress 
to authorize the military to maintain law and order within the 
targeted area until the emergency had passed. The Court has 
circumscribed Congress’s freedom of action in the name of federalism. 
Yet the impermissible, commandeering option potentially leaves room 
for a state role in maintaining law and order, while the permissible, 
preemptive alternative does not allow states to exercise regulatory 
control.2 The primary purpose of this Article is first to suggest that 
this legal regime makes scant sense from a federalism perspective, 
and then to offer a better alternative in its place. 
The Tenth Amendment experienced something of a federalism 
revival during the 1990s,3 when the Rehnquist Court breathed new 
 
 1. See infra Part V for a more detailed exploration of this hypothetical. 
 2. This Article uses the term “preemption” in the sense of direct federal regulation, not 
necessarily in the sense of a complete federal ouster of state regulatory authority. Preemption 
does not always remove states from the regulatory scene, at least not entirely, because federal 
law may set a regulatory floor or ceiling instead of a specific requirement, and states may 
exercise their authority consistently with the federal mandate. 
 3. Other doctrinal areas–specifically, the Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, 
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment–experienced similar federalism revivals. See 
infra notes 30, 164-65 (citing the relevant case law). Noticeably absent from this list is the 
Spending Clause. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress’s Power Under the Commerce 
Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 765 (2003) (“It seems plain 
that truly imposing substantive limits on Congress’s regulatory reach, which the rhetoric of 
Lopez and Morrison describe, and thereby carving out areas of state sovereignty, rather than 
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life into the amendment’s seemingly truistic language.4 First, in New 
York v. United States, the Court held that Congress could not order 
state legislatures either to regulate low-level radioactive waste in 
accordance with federal instructions or to take title to the waste.5 
Then, in Printz v. United States, the Court decided that Congress 
could not order state executive officials to help conduct background 
checks on would-be handgun purchasers on an interim basis.6 In both 
cases, the Court supported its conclusion by stressing the importance 
of political accountability. In New York, for example, Justice O’Connor 
wrote for the Court that  
where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both 
state and federal officials is diminished. If the citizens of New York, for example, do not 
consider that making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best 
interest, they may elect state officials who share their view. That view can always be 
pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the national view, but in 
such a case it is the Federal Government that makes the decision in full view of the 
public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns 
out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal Government directs the 
States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, 
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished 
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with 
the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.7 
Five years later, Justice Scalia stressed “sovereignty” in addition to 
accountability, insisting on behalf of the Court in Printz that “[i]t is 
 
simply directing Congress to work its will in one way or another, will require the Court to 
address the Spending Clause.”); Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (using doctrinal analysis and game theory to examine the scope 
of the conditional spending power going forward); see also infra note 51 (discussing South Dakota 
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)); infra Part II.D (analyzing conditional spending from a federalism 
perspective). 
 4. The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.” The text of the amendment makes explicit what is implicit in both the enumeration 
of powers allocated to Congress in Article I, Section 8 and the bedrock distinction between a 
national government of limited powers and state governments of plenary powers. See, e.g., New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (“The Tenth Amendment . . . restrains the 
power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, 
which . . . is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of 
the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the 
States.”); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (“The amendment states but a 
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”). 
 5. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the “take title” provision of the Low Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 constitutes unconstitutional compulsion and 
commandeering of the governmental capacity of state governments). 
 6. 521 U. S. 898 (1997) (relying on a Tenth Amendment anticommandeering rationale in 
holding unconstitutional certain interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act). 
 7. 505 U.S. at 168-69. 
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the very principle of separate state sovereignty that [commandeering] 
offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can 
overcome that fundamental defect.”8 Anticommandeering doctrine 
thus prohibits the federal government from requiring the states to 
enact, to administer, or to enforce a federal regulatory program under 
any circumstances. 
Commentators have exposed vulnerabilities in the Court’s 
anticommandeering logic. In light of the silence of the Constitution on 
commandeering,9 the absence of strong support for New York and 
Printz in originalist sources,10 and the only modest backing for these 
decisions throughout American history and in the U.S. Reports,11 it is 
not clear that political accountability is a Tenth Amendment value, let 
alone one that the Court is charged with vindicating broadly and 
aggressively through a categorical rule.12 Nor is it clear that 
commandeering inevitably generates serious accountability concerns 
regardless of what Congress, the states, the news media, or citizens 
may do to address potential problems. Even after factoring in search 
costs and rational ignorance, it seems likely that citizens who pay 
attention to public affairs and who care to inquire will be able to 
discern which level of government is responsible for a government 
regulation, and citizens who do not care to inquire may be largely 
beyond judicial or political help on the accountability front. They may 
not be part of “the public” in whose “full view” the federal government 
preempts state law.13 Government officials also have an abiding 
 
 8. 521 U.S. at 932. 
 9. The text of the Tenth Amendment says nothing of commandeering. See supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. By contrast, Article I, Section 8 speaks explicitly to the broad scope of 
Congress’s power. 
 10. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“In deciding these cases, which 
I have found closer than I had anticipated, it is The Federalist that finally determines my 
position. I believe that the most straightforward reading of No. 27 is authority for the 
Government’s position here, and that this reading is both supported by No. 44 and consistent 
with Nos. 36 and 45.”). 
 11. In Printz, Justice Scalia conceded for the Court that “[t]he constitutional practice we 
have examined above tends to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here, but 
is not conclusive.” Id. at 918. As for precedent, which Justice Scalia turned to “most conclusively 
in the present litigation,” id. at 925, the Court focused most of its attention on New York. Id. at 
925-31. 
 12. Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2201, 2204 (1998) (Commandeering “can risk confusing the lines of 
political accountability—but the extent to which this is likely (or more likely than in other forms 
of federal-state action) depends on the substance and substantiality of the burden. Political 
accountability may be relevant but does not of itself justify the broad rule adopted by the 
Court.”); id. at 2257 (“Although bright-line rules may offer comparative advantages in reducing 
risks of error or bias by other decisionmakers (here, lower courts), they do so only at the 
inevitable cost of being overinclusive or underinclusive in serving their substantive purposes.”). 
 13. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
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interest in informing voters when they are responsible for popular 
actions. And when these actions prove unpopular, such that politicians 
have an incentive to engage in blame shifting, the popular press often 
serves to advance political accountability. Finally, federal preemption 
and conditional spending also trigger accountability concerns.14 So 
does giving states the choice between commandeering and 
preemption.15 
Even if one believes that commandeering triggers political 
accountability concerns appropriate for judicial vindication, the 
question arises whether accountability exhausts the relevant 
constitutional considerations, or whether other federalism values are 
pertinent to the proper scope of anticommandeering doctrine. This 
inquiry argues that the constitutional calculus is considerably more 
complicated than the Court’s opinions suggest. The following analysis 
captures the factors in play by articulating a simple expected-value 
equation and unpacking its components. The analysis uses this 
equation to trace out the consequences of anticommandeering 
doctrine—both widely recognized and potentially counterintuitive—for 
the Constitution’s commitment to federalism. 
This investigation shows that several distinct concerns are at 
stake—values central to the project of federalism—and further 
 
 14. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, 
in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 231 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) (“[T]he danger of 
blurring lines of accountability in the case of commandeering is not categorically different from 
what happens in the case of federal pre-emption, which the Court accepts. In both cases, the 
component State’s actions or inactions are only partially determined by State politicians, yet 
citizens are likely to view the component State officials as fully responsible whenever the latter 
are the most salient agents involved. In both cases proper lines of accountability can be 
preserved when component States are vigilant in publicizing the respective roles of the federal 
and State policy-makers on any given issue. Given proper information, citizens should find the 
lines of accountability reasonably clear.”); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and 
Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1001, 1054-55 (1995) (“Commandeering precludes state officials from being directly and 
exclusively responsive to their constituency’s desires, but so does conventional preemption. 
Although one can use verbal wordplay to make it sound as though commandeering and 
preemption frustrate accountability in different ways, this is merely definitional manipulation 
without substance. Prohibiting commandeering but not preemption in the name of securing the 
accountability of state government is simply arbitrary.”) (footnote omitted); Jackson, supra note 
12, at 2202 (“Standard preemption—the effect of federal law in negating the area in which state 
law can operate—can obscure the causes of inaction by state officials. Conditional spending 
regulatory requirements, though nominally involving a state’s choice to accept federal funds, can 
result in a very confusing picture of responsibility to voters. Why, then, would commandeering be 
different?” (footnote omitted)). See also infra Parts II.D, IV.E (discussing accountability concerns 
in various regulatory contexts). 
 15. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 386 n.51 (2005) (“It is possible that this attenuation of political 
accountability is one reason cooperative federalism is popular.”). 
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demonstrates that anticommandeering doctrine causes net harm to 
federalism values under certain circumstances.16 Specifically, New 
York and Printz vindicate federalism values to some extent by 
addressing any accountability problems caused by commandeering 
and by requiring the federal government to internalize more of the 
costs of federal regulation before engaging in regulation. At the same 
time, however, anticommandeering doctrine undermines federalism 
values when the (clearly constitutional) alternative of preemption is 
reasonably available and the commandeering ban thus places states in 
danger of losing regulatory control in a greater number of future 
instances.17 This consequence of the doctrine is problematic from a 
federalism perspective because direct federal regulation limits state 
regulatory power to a greater extent than does commandeering as a 
general matter, and states must retain regulatory control in order to 
realize the values typically associated with federalism.18 
This investigation demonstrates that anticommandeering 
doctrine is seriously over- and under-inclusive, whether considered in 
light of federalism values as a whole or in light of the accountability 
concerns on which the Court has inappropriately fixated. This 
disconnect between legal doctrine and animating values suggests that 
the Rehnquist Court’s Tenth Amendment legacy has more to do with a 
symbolic and judicially manageable gesture in the direction of “states’ 
rights” than with the substance of federalism as constitutional law 
intended to safeguard state autonomy. For a federalism concerned 
with state retention of regulatory control, the relevant questions 
sound in a distinctly constitutional form of cost-benefit analysis.19 The 
 
 16. For a discussion of the values that federalism is thought to advance and their 
dependence upon meaningful levels of state regulatory control, see infra notes 87-95 and 
accompanying text. 
 17. Preemption is the constitutional principle derived from the Supremacy Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, providing that if a conflict exists between valid federal law and state or local 
laws, federal law controls and the state or local laws are invalidated on the ground that federal 
law is supreme. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) 
(“[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, any state law, 
however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to 
federal law, must yield.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (concluding that federal law trumps state laws that “interfere with, or are 
contrary to the laws of Congress” because “[i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is 
supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, 
must yield to it”). In New York, Justice O’Connor stated that preemption, unlike commandeering, 
does not trigger Tenth Amendment concerns. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 18. This consequence is also problematic because preemption raises accountability concerns 
of its own. See supra note 14. 
 19. While cost-benefit analysis is arguably external to constitutional law (though balancing 
tests are similar), here the values determining the range of cognizable costs and benefits are 
internal to constitutional doctrine in the sense that the Court’s federalism opinions have 
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decisive issues are (1) whether the proffered accountability benefits 
generated by current Tenth Amendment doctrine are cost-justified by 
exceeding the expected damage to state regulatory control (and 
political accountability) caused by preemption, and (2) whether the 
relative financial and temporal costs to the states of commandeering, 
as opposed to preemption, tip the balance one way or the other. 
The upshot of this analysis is that instances of commandeering 
should carry a presumption of unconstitutionality when preemption is 
not a feasible alternative in the short run, the federal mandate is 
unfunded and expensive, and the federal government makes little 
effective effort to alleviate reasonable accountability concerns. Only a 
substantial governmental interest should suffice to overcome this 
presumption. By contrast, commandeering should be held 
constitutional as far as the Tenth Amendment is concerned when 
preemption constitutes a feasible alternative in the short run and such 
preemption would reduce state regulatory control relative to the 
commandeering at issue, the federal mandate is fully funded or 
relatively inexpensive to carry out, and the federal government takes 
effective measures to maintain lines of accountability (or 
accountability is for some other reason not seriously threatened). 
  Thus, this approach to commandeering turns the conventional 
wisdom about New York and Printz on its head. According to the 
standard accountability story, the “hard” commandeering of the state 
legislative process at issue in New York was more invasive and thus 
more problematic than the relatively “soft,” interim commandeering of 
state and local executive officials implicated in Printz.20 Incorporating 
concerns about regulatory control into the analysis, however, changes 
the calculus significantly. Because federal preemption was reasonably 
available (and indeed had already been threatened21) in New York but 
not in Printz, and because New York did not in fact involve more 
serious accountability concerns, this inquiry submits that Printz 
remains the closer case and New York the easier one—but that New 
York was easier in the opposite direction. Instead of an “easy kill,” the 
federal law at issue in New York should have been upheld against the 
state’s Tenth Amendment challenge.  
Part I briefly surveys the Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment 
cases, focusing on the decisions between 1990 and the present. Part II 
conducts a theoretical analysis of anticommandeering doctrine from a 
federalism perspective, and Part III applies this analysis to New York 
 
identified these values as relevant to the practice of constitutional adjudication. See infra Part 
IV.A. 
 20. See infra Part III for a discussion of this issue. 
 21. See id. 
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and Printz. Part IV anticipates various potential objections to the 
argument, and Part V employs a war-on-terror hypothetical to 
illustrate the argument’s potential force. The Conclusion defends 
substantive standards and balancing and rejects categorical rules 
sounding mostly in symbolism as the proper approach to federalism 
questions in constitutional law. 
I.  A SHORT SURVEY OF TENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
Throughout American history, one of two conceptions of the 
Tenth Amendment has prevailed at a given time. During the 1800s, 
the Supreme Court viewed the amendment not as an independent 
limit on legislative authority that Congress might violate, but rather 
as a reminder that the federal government is one of limited powers, 
such that Congress may legislate in a certain area only if the 
Constitution grants it authority to do so.22 
During the early 1900s and up until 1937, the Court embraced 
the very different understanding that the Tenth Amendment 
safeguards state autonomy from federal overreaching. According to 
this view, the amendment reserves a zone of exclusive regulatory 
authority to the states, and courts must hold unconstitutional federal 
laws that disregard this exclusive reservation of power. Specifically, 
the pre-1937 Court concluded that the Tenth Amendment left to the 
states sole control over the production of goods, so that federal laws 
aimed at regulating production were invalid.23 
From 1937 until the early 1990s, the Court reverted to its 
nineteenth-century view of the Tenth Amendment.24 During this 
period, the Court found only one Tenth Amendment violation. That 
decision—National League of Cities v. Usery25—was overruled less 
 
 22. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97 (“[If], as has always been understood, the 
sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the 
power over commerce . . . among the several states . . . is vested in Congress as absolutely as it 
would be in a single government.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251, 273-74 (1918) 
(invalidating a federal law prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced in 
factories employing child labor because “[t]he grant of power to Congress over the subject of 
interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to 
control the States in their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture”). 
 24. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart 
in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), which 
prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made by employees whose wages or 
hours contravened the Act’s protections, in part because the Tenth “Amendment states but a 
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered”). See also supra note 4 (quoting the 
Court’s opinion in Darby). 
 25. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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than a decade later after being distinguished into oblivion. In National 
League of Cities, the Court held 5-4 that applying the minimum-wage 
provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) to state 
and local employees violated the Tenth Amendment because the 
statute “operate[d] to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.”26 
The Court did not explain how to identify a “traditional governmental 
functio[n],” and it unpersuasively distinguished National League of 
Cities in a series of subsequent decisions.27 The Court finally overruled 
National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority,28 holding that the FLSA could constitutionally be 
applied to state and local governments. Writing for himself and the 
four National League of Cities dissenters, Justice Blackmun 
“reject[ed], as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule 
of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial 
appraisal of whether a particular government function is ‘traditional’ 
or ‘integral.’”29 
The Rehnquist Court’s reinvigoration of the Tenth Amendment 
began in 1991 in a case raising a question of statutory interpretation, 
not constitutional law. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,30 Missouri state-court 
judges challenged, as violative of the federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”),31 the mandatory retirement age set forth 
in the state constitution.32 In so doing, the Supreme Court issued a 
“clear statement” rule of statutory interpretation: Justice O’Connor 
wrote for the majority that the Court will construe federal law to 
apply to important state government activities only if Congress issues 
 
 26. Id. at 852. Justice Blackmun cast the decisive vote. He wrote ambiguously and 
ominously that the majority had adopted “a balancing approach [that] . . . does not outlaw 
federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is 
demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would 
be essential.” Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 27. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment 
challenge to the application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to the states); Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment 
challenge to the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, which required state utility 
commissions to consider FERC proposals). In each decision, the majority was composed of Justice 
Blackmun and the four National League of Cities dissenters. 
 28. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 29. Id. at 546-47. Because Garcia remains good law, states have a legal duty to comply with 
the FLSA. But the Rehnquist Court severely limited Garcia’s impact by holding that state 
sovereign immunity prohibits most private suits for money damages to remedy even willful state 
violations of concededly valid federal law in federal or state courts. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706 (1999); infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (citing the relevant case law). 
 30. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006). 
 32. 501 U.S. at 456. 
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a clear statement that it wants the law to apply to the states in these 
circumstances.33 Because the ADEA lacked such a clear statement, the 
Court concluded that the law did not preempt the state’s mandatory 
retirement age.34 In so holding, the Court underscored the role of the 
states in preventing tyranny and the importance of the Tenth 
Amendment in protecting state regulatory autonomy.35 
A year later, the Court issued an arguably novel constitutional 
holding in a Tenth Amendment case.36 At issue in New York v. United 
States37 was the validity of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985,38 which required states to arrange for 
the safe disposal of radioactive waste produced within their borders. 
The statute gave states monetary and access incentives to comply with 
its requirements, permitting states to impose a surcharge on waste 
coming from other states and eventually to deny access to disposal 
sites.39 The most controversial part of the law, included to secure 
adequate state regulatory action,40 mandated that states would “take 
title” to any radioactive waste within their borders that was not 
appropriately disposed of by a certain date and would then “be liable 
for all damages directly or indirectly incurred.”41  
The Court affirmed Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate the disposal of radioactive waste.42 The Court also 
upheld the act’s financial incentives as within Congress’s power under 
 
 33. Id. at 461. 
 34. Id. at 467. 
 35. Id. at 458 (“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the 
Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a 
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of 
tyranny and abuse from either front.”); id. at 461 (“This plain statement rule is nothing more 
than an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our 
constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”); id. at 463 
(“[T]he authority of the people of the States to determine the qualifications of their most 
important government officials . . . is an authority that lies at the heart of representative 
government. It is a power reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment . . . .” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 36. One could argue that the 1990s anticommandeering decisions were not entirely novel. 
National League of Cities could be viewed as an indirect form of anticommandeering, preventing 
Congress from forcing states to increase taxes or to reduce services in order to comply with the 
FLSA’s minimum-wage provisions. Moreover, the Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Association cited lower court opinions, see infra note 183, in writing that “there can 
be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.” 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
 37. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b to 2296b-7 (2006). 
 39. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1992). 
 40. See infra Part III for a discussion of the rationale behind the commandeering provision. 
 41. New York, 505 U.S. at 153. 
 42. Id. at 159-60. 
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the Commerce and Spending Clauses,43 and sustained the law’s access 
incentives as a conditional exercise of Congress’s commerce power. 
Congress, in other words, was constitutionally giving states the choice 
between “regulat[ing] the disposal of radioactive waste according to 
federal standards by attaining local or regional self-sufficiency” and 
having “their residents who produce radioactive waste . . . be subject 
to federal regulation authorizing sited States and regions to deny 
access to their disposal sites.”44 
The Court, however, held the “take title” provision 
unconstitutional. Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice O’Connor 
stated that this provision forced states to choose between “accepting 
ownership of waste” and “regulating according to the instructions of 
Congress.”45 Neither imposition was permissible, she concluded, 
because requiring states to accept ownership would unconstitutionally 
“commandeer” state governments, and mandating compliance with 
federal regulatory acts would unlawfully force states to implement 
federal statutes.46 Justice O’Connor declared that “[t]he Federal 
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program.”47 
As noted above,48 the Court’s constitutional concerns in New 
York v. United States centered on the issue of political accountability. 
In the Court’s view, Congress was requiring the states to regulate, yet 
the states (not the federal government) might be held politically 
accountable for the regulatory activity. The Court reasoned that 
citizens affected by the regulations would see who was doing the 
regulating, not who had made the decision to order regulation in the 
first place.49 
Despite holding that Congress may not force state legislatures 
to pass laws or require state administrative agencies to promulgate 
regulations, the New York Court stressed that Congress was hardly 
impotent. The Court stated that Congress could bypass state 
regulatory regimes entirely by establishing federal standards that all 
actors, public and private, must meet. Congress, in other words, could 
 
 43. Id. at 171-73. 
 44. Id. at 174. See infra Part IV.D for an analysis of federal laws that give states the choice 
between commandeering and preemption. 
 45. New York, 505 U.S. at 175. It is noteworthy that Justice Souter joined the majority in 
New York and dissented in Printz. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 188. 
 48. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 49. Id. See infra Part III for an argument that the Court’s concerns were misplaced on the 
facts of New York. 
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preempt state and local regulatory activity.50 Moreover, the Court 
affirmed that Congress could condition federal funding of state and 
local government activities on their compliance with related 
regulatory requirements that Congress could not impose directly: 
This is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to encourage a State to regulate in a 
particular way, or that Congress may not hold out incentives to the States as a method 
of influencing a State’s policy choices. Our cases have identified a variety of methods, 
short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative 
program consistent with federal interests. . . . [U]nder Congress’ spending power, 
“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”51  
Accordingly, Congress could induce states to clean up radioactive 
waste by placing conditions on federal grants, even though Congress 
could not force states to clean up the waste. Finally, the Court 
declared that the Constitution allows Congress to give states the 
choice between being commandeered and being preempted.52   
The Justices fought their next Tenth Amendment battle five 
years later. In Printz v. United States,53 the question presented was 
whether the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act54 
contravened the Tenth Amendment by requiring state and local law 
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on would-be 
handgun buyers on an interim basis until a federal computer database 
was created.55 Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia 
declared the law unconstitutional. He stressed, among other things,56 
that Congress was unlawfully commandeering state executive officers 
to enforce federal law. In the early years of the Republic and 
 
 50. See supra text accompanying note 7; see also supra note 17. 
 51. New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)). 
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court held 7-2 that Congress may condition five percent of 
federal highway funds on a recipient state’s adopting a 21-year-old drinking age, even assuming 
(but not deciding) that the Twenty-First Amendment would prohibit Congress from imposing a 
national minimum drinking age directly. 483 U.S. at 217-18. Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed for 
the Court that the condition was “clearly stated,” was “directly related to one of the main 
purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel,” and was not “so 
coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.” Id. at 208, 211. 
 52. New York, 505 U.S. at 174; see also infra note 172 (quoting this portion of the Court’s 
opinion in New York). For an analysis of this option, see infra Part IV.D. See infra Part III for a 
discussion of Justice White’s dissent in New York. 
 53. See supra notes 6, 8. 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006). 
 55. See infra note 190 for a discussion of the federal database, which is now operating. 
 56. The Court also concluded that the Act violated the separation of powers because 
Congress had taken some of the executive power that Article II vests exclusively in the President 
and given it to state and local law enforcement officers. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 989, 
922 (1997). For a critical discussion of “unitary executive theory” in the commandeering context 
published just before Printz came down, see Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State 
Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075 (1997) (citing and analyzing the 
relevant literature). 
  
2006] A FEDERALISM PERSPECTIVE 1641 
throughout American history, Justice Scalia wrote, Congress had not 
engaged in such commandeering. The Court reaffirmed New York and 
concluded that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from 
conscripting state governments.57 
The Rehnquist Court decided just one other Tenth Amendment 
case. In Reno v. Condon,58 the Justices rejected a Tenth Amendment 
challenge to a federal statute. At issue was the federal Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), which prohibited states from 
disclosing personal information gained by departments of motor 
vehicles (“DMVs”), including home addresses, phone numbers, and 
social security numbers.59 The Court unanimously reversed the 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
which had held that the DPPA unconstitutionally commanded states 
not to disclose the information.60 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist distinguished New York and Printz. He reasoned that in 
Condon Congress was not regulating private actors indirectly by 
commandeering the regulatory apparatus of the states; rather, 
Congress was regulating directly all entities that possess the driver’s 
license information–states and private entities alike.61 Accordingly, 
the Court concluded that the DPPA did not trigger accountability 
concerns. 
The Court has not issued a Tenth Amendment holding since 
2000. Federal courts of appeals have invalidated only two other 
federal laws on Tenth Amendment grounds in recent years.62  
 
 57. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923. In a dissent joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
Justice Stevens underscored the need for the Brady Act and rejected the animating principle of 
Printz: “When Congress exercises the powers delegated to it by the Constitution, it may impose 
affirmative obligations on executive and judicial officers of state and local governments as well as 
ordinary citizens.” Id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 58. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006). 
 60. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 465 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 61. Condon, 528 U.S. at 146-51. 
 62. See Ass’n of Comm. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edwards (ACORN), 81 F.3d 1387, 1392-94 
(5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating part of the Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
300j-21 to 300j-26 (2006), which required each state to “establish a program” to assist local 
educational agencies, schools, and day care centers in remedying potential lead contamination in 
their drinking water systems on threat of civil enforcement proceedings); Bd. of Natural Res. v. 
Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 946-47 (9th Cir. 1993) (invalidating part of the Forest Resources 
Conservation and Shortage Relief Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 620-620j (2006), which significantly 
restricted the export of unprocessed timber harvested from state, but not privately owned, public 
lands in the western continental United States, and which required states to issue regulations 
implementing the export ban). A question worth exploring is why New York and Printz have had 
so little generative force to date. Possible explanations include: (1) few federal laws commandeer; 
(2) states do not want to challenge some federal statutes that commandeer because of agreement 
with them; (3) sometimes the costs to the states imposed by commandeering are minimal; and (4) 
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In sum, the Court has categorically prohibited the federal 
government from requiring states to enact, to administer, or to enforce 
a federal regulatory program. Anticommandeering doctrine thus 
disables the federal government from using the states as regulators; it 
does not preclude the federal government from treating the states as 
regulated entities. 
II. A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF ANTICOMMANDEERING DOCTRINE 
A. The Federalism Costs of Commandeering 
A comprehensive examination of anticommandeering 
doctrine—one that includes but transcends the Supreme Court’s focus 
on accountability—must account for the impact of federal regulation 
on federalism values as a whole in light of the full range of 
congressional options. The components of such an examination can be 
captured by the following expected-value equation: 
 
E(Cfed reg) = pfed reg * Cfed reg.63 
 
E(Cfed reg) represents the expected costs to federalism values of a 
federal regulation, whether commandeering, preemption, a choice 
between commandeering and preemption, or conditional federal 
spending.64 pfed reg is the probability that the federal government will 
regulate, and Cfed reg identifies the costs to federalism values imposed 
by the federal regulation. The probability of federal regulation (pfed reg) 
is a function of the financial and political accountability costs 
associated with engaging in federal regulation. The costs to federalism 
values (Cfed reg) sound in economics, public policy, and politics. They 
include: (1) the costs to states, in terms of time and money, of 
complying with or implementing a federal regulation,65 including 
 
states may fear that preemption would follow a successful challenge to a commandeering law, 
and preemption would be worse from their perspective. 
 63. The equation in the text is not essential to advance the argument. But the equation 
usefully underscores that federalism values are affected by both the probability of federal 
regulation and the federalism costs imposed by such regulation. As explored below, moreover, 
the equation captures the counterintuitive theoretical tradeoff among federalism values that 
anticommandeering doctrine can generate. 
 64. This inquiry uses the term “regulation” in a generic, non-technical sense, a sense that 
includes use of the conditional spending power. See infra note 74 (distinguishing mandatory from 
non-mandatory forms of federal regulation). 
 65. Professor Vicki Jackson notes the possible “difference . . . between Congress requiring 
the states to do something that costs a lot (in terms of time or money) [and] something that does 
not.” Jackson, supra note 12, at 2202. She argues that such a concern “would not justify a flat 
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opportunity costs;66 (2) the loss (or imposition) of regulatory control 
that federal regulation may demand; and (3) the accountability costs 
(and associated voter disapproval) that federal regulation may require 
states to incur and allow the federal government to avoid.67 
Thus, accountability concerns implicate both the probability of 
federal regulation and the federalism costs that such regulation 
imposes. Professor Jackson usefully identifies three distinct 
dimensions to the “political accountability” argument: 
First, voters may hold state officers politically accountable for a choice that was not 
theirs, or which the officers were forced by federal law to make, without appreciating 
the source of the substantive rule or the forced nature of the decision, respectively. 
Second, voters may fail to hold federal officials politically accountable for choices they do 
make that impose further choices, or costs, on state governments. And third, federal 
legislators may not themselves feel as politically accountable, and responsible, if they 
can direct states to carry out programs (especially if these programs are not financed 
from federal revenues).68 
Professor Jackson’s third type of accountability concern affects the 
probability of federal regulation; her first and second categories 
implicate both the probability of federal regulation and the federalism 
costs imposed by such regulation. 
 
anticommandeering rule, but might instead lead to rules that focus on the substantiality of the 
burdens, or the possibility of federal subsidy or waiver for localities for which a requirement is 
particularly burdensome.” Id. at 2202-03 (footnotes omitted). 
 66. These costs are critical not as ends of federalism in themselves, but because 
commandeering “absorbs government resources that the states might direct elsewhere.” Deborah 
Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
1563, 1580 & n.65 (1994); see also Jackson, supra note 12, at 2204 (“[T]he more substantial the 
burden, the greater the possibility that state officers will be unable to attend to state business 
because of the need to carry out federal directives.”). Professor H. Jefferson Powell’s defense of 
New York sounds in the related prudential considerations of state “initiation” and “immunity.” 
H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 63, 686-87 (1993). 
Likewise, Professor Caminker, although generally critical of anticommandeering doctrine, agrees 
that “[w]hen Congress requires states to fund an expensive enforcement program, the state 
might be forced to respond by diverting energies and funds from existing state programs in order 
to comply with the federal mandate. In this fashion ‘unfunded mandates’ can generate what 
might non-technically be called externalities; not only do they constrain state discretion over the 
subject matter being federally regulated, but the costs they impose can pressure the state to cut 
back on unrelated programs.” Caminker, supra note 14, at 1079-80. 
 67. The equation in the text might seem oversimplified because it assumes that federal 
regulation imposes only costs from the standpoint of federalism values, not benefits. Federal 
regulation may be beneficial for any number of reasons. For instance, the federal government 
may be best equipped to deal with a problem confronting citizens of the state, perhaps because 
interstate externalities like pollution are present. This inquiry’s exclusive focus on costs can be 
justified, however, because the various federalism benefits conferred by federal regulation can be 
expressed analytically in terms of negative costs. Consider, for example, the “take title” provision 
at issue in New York, which alleviated a collective action problem between the sited and unsited 
states. See supra Part I; infra Part III. Such federal legislation is properly viewed as enhancing 
state regulatory control and thus as reducing the federalism costs imposed by federal regulation. 
 68. Jackson, supra note 12, at 2201. 
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B. The Standard Account of Anticommandeering Doctrine 
Anticommandeering doctrine vindicates federalism values69 not 
only to the extent that it reduces the financial and accountability costs 
of federal regulation (the first and third components of Cfed reg), but 
also to the extent that it forces the federal government to internalize 
more of the financial and accountability costs associated with 
regulating.70 As law and economics posits, actors that do not 
internalize the full costs of their behavior tend to engage in too much 
of the behavior.71  The same holds true for government regulators. All 
other things being equal, anticommandeering doctrine reduces the 
expected costs of federal regulation (E(Cfed reg)) by lowering the 
probability of such regulation (pfed reg).72 
In this regard, anticommandeering doctrine advances 
federalism values in two ways. First, the doctrine reduces the 
probability that preemptive federal regulation will be enacted. It does 
so because the federal government may not be willing to bear all of the 
financial costs of such regulation, and anticommandeering doctrine 
prohibits cost externalization through commandeering.73 Second, the 
 
 69. For a discussion of the various values that federalism is thought to advance, see infra 
notes 87-95 and accompanying text. 
 70. Note that the federal government does not internalize all of the costs of federal 
regulation when it preempts state law because states are bound by valid federal law and often 
must incur costs to comply. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 71. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 40-42 (3d ed. 2000) 
(discussing externalities and the role of law in encouraging the internalization of external costs). 
 72. Accord Caminker, supra note 14, at 1073 (“Congress might enact a commandeering 
statute where, absent this possibility, it would have enacted no federal legislation at all. The 
result is an increase in the total quantity of federal legislation, shifting exercised regulatory 
power from the states to the federal government.”); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two 
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004) (arguing that “the anticommandeering doctrine helps 
shore up the political safeguards of federalism by forcing the national government to internalize 
the costs—both fiscal and political—of its actions”); id. at 127-28 (discussing the “two kinds of 
costs” that “[f]orbidding commandeering requires the national government to internalize”). 
Professor Young assumes that the federal government internalizes all of the benefits of federal 
regulation. The optimal level of federal regulation would change if this assumption were false in 
a particular setting. For example, public confusion might allow state officials to reap some of the 
political rewards for popular federal regulations that the states had no hand in enacting or 
implementing. In this scenario, cost-benefit efficiency might be advanced by having the federal 
government externalize some of the costs of federal regulation in addition to some of the benefits. 
 73. The financial costs to the federal government of preemption vary widely depending on 
the context. Sometimes the costs are negligible. For instance, if Congress imposed requirements 
for nuclear-waste disposal, the federal government would externalize most of the financial costs. 
Private businesses that produce such waste would need to make arrangements with states that 
possess disposal facilities. At other times, however, the costs are substantial. For example, it 
likely would have been very expensive for the federal government to have conducted all 
background checks on would-be firearms purchasers from the moment the Brady Act went into 
effect. See supra Part I (discussing Printz); infra Part III (same). 
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ban on commandeering prevents any kind of mandatory federal 
regulation when preemption does not constitute a feasible 
congressional alternative.74 Preemption will not always be reasonably 
available, at least in the short run, as is suggested by the difficulty of 
conceiving feasible preemptive alternatives in Printz.75 
Anticommandeering doctrine cannot compromise state regulatory 
authority when more onerous regulatory alternatives are not available 
to the federal government. 
This cost-internalization rationale for anticommandeering 
doctrine provides a relatively clear, analytically tractable principle 
that is ideologically evenhanded. Events that occurred shortly after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 illustrate this rationale for 
anticommandeering doctrine.76 For example, the federal government 
asked state and local law enforcement officers to help execute a 
“nationwide plan to interview as many as 5,000 Mideast men ages 18 
to 33 here on visas.”77 While most state and local law enforcement 
officials obliged, “[t]he Portland, Ore., chief said his department 
wouldn’t assist the government, while Ann Arbor Police Chief Daniel 
Oates–with 79 people in his city to be interviewed–ha[d]n’t committed 
to allowing his officers to conduct interviews.”78 Because of 
anticommandeering doctrine, the federal government could not 
require state and local law enforcement officers to conduct the 
interviews. In this instance, the unavailability of commandeering 
advanced the values not only of federalists but also of civil 
libertarians.79 
 
 74. Conditional federal spending does not constitute a form of mandatory federal regulation 
because states may escape regulation by declining the associated federal funding. See infra Part 
II.D. 
 75. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 1231 (2004) (discussing the several states and many local governments that have 
resisted the perceived excesses of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT 
ACT”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001), either by announcing their disapproval 
or by ordering their law enforcement personnel not to cooperate in enforcing the law); Ernest A. 
Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on 
Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (2004) (arguing that “the question of the national 
government’s ability to require state and local cooperation with federal anti-terrorism 
initiatives . . . illustrates the several different ways in which federalism promotes and protects 
individual freedom”). 
 77. David Shepardson, FBI to Help Question 650 Men, THE DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 27, 2001, 
at 1A. 
 78. Id. 
 79. To recognize the force of this example, one need not agree that the PATRIOT Act in 
particular compromises civil liberties. The ratio of state and local to federal law enforcement 
personnel in the United States is greater than 10 to 1. See Young, supra note 76, at 1281 
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C. Problematizing the Standard Theory 
All other things being equal, therefore, anticommandeering 
doctrine reduces the expected costs of federal regulation by lowering 
the probability of such regulation. But—and this is a potentially big 
“but”—all other things are not always equal when the Court removes 
commandeering as an option. Anticommandeering doctrine may 
increase the costs of federal regulation (Cfed reg) because the 
unavailability of commandeering may result in more instances of 
federal preemption going forward. And preemption, an obvious and 
constitutional alternative to commandeering,80 may impede the 
vindication of federalism values not only by raising accountability 
problems of its own, but also by reducing the regulatory roles of the 
states at the level of policy implementation.81 When states are 
commandeered, they retain (often significant) discretion to determine 
how to implement the federal mandate. Preemption, by contrast, 
bypasses state regulatory authority.82 In a New York-type situation, 
 
(contrasting the more than one million state and local law enforcement personnel with the 
roughly 93,000 full-time federal law enforcement personnel from surveys conducted in 2000 and 
2002, respectively); see also William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 
2137, 2181 (2002) (documenting that the overwhelming majority of law enforcement personnel 
nationwide are state and local police officers). “At least in the short term,” therefore, “the FBI 
and other federal law enforcement institutions are unlikely to cover the many responsibilities 
that ‘homeland security’ entails without substantial state and local assistance.” Young, supra 
note 76, at 1281. See also Althouse, supra note 76, at 1232 (“[I]n carrying out the massive federal 
effort needed to deal with terrorism after September 11, 2001, the national government 
inevitably looks to the vast number of police, health workers, and other personnel employed at 
the state and local government levels.”). Because anticommandeering doctrine requires Congress 
to internalize more of the costs of regulation before regulating, the doctrine can help to safeguard 
civil liberties any time a proposed federal law would compromise them–either by reducing the 
likelihood of enactment or by reducing enforcement. 
 Of course, there is a flip side. Federal legislation aimed at protecting constitutional rights 
would also be less likely to be enacted or enforced in the presence of a commandeering ban. More 
generally, the ban impedes realization of any national interest, no matter how weighty or 
legitimate, that the federal government may seek to advance. Examining the various regulatory 
options “from a federalism perspective,” as this inquiry does, does not take all of the relevant 
constitutional values into account. 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 7, 50. 
 81. Another option at Congress’ disposal is use of the conditional spending power. See supra 
notes 3, 51 and accompanying text (discussing Dole); infra Part II.D (analyzing the conditional 
spending power from a federalism perspective). Still another alternative would be for Congress to 
give states a choice between being preempted and being commandeered. See supra notes 44, 52 
and accompanying text (discussing the New York Court’s validation of this approach); infra Part 
IV.D (analyzing the implications of the availability of this alternative for the legitimacy of 
commandeering from a federalism perspective). 
 82. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 14, at 1002, 1006-07 (“In some situations Congress can 
even use state intermediaries as a means of preserving a significant role for state discretion in 
achieving specified federal goals, where the alternative is complete federal preemption of any 
state regulatory role. . . . Indeed, on occasion this approach allows Congress to govern in a 
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for example, states that regulate low-level radioactive waste in 
accordance with federal instructions have more say regarding how 
such waste is regulated than states whose regulatory activities are 
preempted by federal law. In the Printz scenario, to consider another 
example, Congress (at least theoretically) could have created a federal 
bureaucracy to conduct the background checks from the moment that 
the Brady Act went into effect.83 Federalists, who presumably want 
states to participate in regulating gun possession, might sensibly 
prefer commandeering to preemption. 
A key factor, therefore, is the likelihood that the federal 
government will preempt in the future if the Court disallows 
commandeering. This probability may depend on whether there are 
constitutional limits on preemption,84 and whether Congress and the 
President have incentives to preempt, as opposed to regulating in 
some other way or not regulating at all. To account for this question, 
the simple equation that captures the expected costs of federal 
regulation E(Cfed reg)85 can be disaggregated as follows: 
 
E(Cfed reg) = E(Ccommandeer) + E(Ccond spend) + E(Cno fed reg) + E(Cpreempt). 
 
E(Ccommandeer) represents the expected costs to federalism values of 
commandeering; E(Ccond spend) indicates the expected costs of 
conditional federal spending; E(Cno fed reg) denotes the expected costs of 
no federal regulation; and E(Cpreempt) is the expected costs of 
preemption. Now let 
 
E(Ccommandeer) = pcommandeer * Ccommandeer, 
E(Ccond spend) = pcond spend * Ccond spend, 
E(Cno fed reg) = pno fed reg * Cno fed reg, and 
E(Cpreempt) = (1- pcommandeer - pcond spend - pno fed reg) * Cpreempt, 
 
 
decentralized manner that is more respectful of state autonomy.”); id. at 1011 (distinguishing 
“two basic commandeering techniques”–that is, “ministerial mandates” and “bounded discretion 
mandates”–the latter of which “order state officials to reach a specified federal objective, but 
afford these officials some degree of discretion in deciding how to do so,” an approach that “is 
particularly supportive of states’ political discretion” and “enhances the prospect that the 
resulting policy will reflect local needs and concerns as well as the national interest”). 
 83. Congress could not have required licensed gun dealers to abide by the federal regulation 
directly because a computer database was not immediately available. See infra notes 147, 190 
and accompanying text. 
 84. See infra Part IV.C. 
 85. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
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where px represents the probability of x federal action, and (1- 
pcommandeer - pcond spend - pno fed reg) stands for the probability of preemption. 
It follows that 
 
E(Cfed reg) = (pcommandeer * Ccommandeer) + (pcond spend * Ccond spend) + (pno fed reg * 
Cno fed reg) + [(1- pcommandeer - pcond spend - pno fed reg) * Cpreempt].86 
 
As this symbolic representation underscores, the critical issue 
is the size of pcond spend and pno fed reg. As pcond spend and pno fed reg approach 
0, a judicial ban on commandeering will result in preemptive 
regulation, for the probability of preemption will approach 1. As pcond 
spend or pno fed reg approaches 1, anticommandeering doctrine yields no 
mandatory federal regulation. To reiterate, the relative sizes of the 
various probabilities depend upon constitutional constraints and upon 
the incentives of Congress and the President to condition federal funds 
on state compliance with federal regulatory demands, to preempt in 
the areas covered by the Court’s anticommandeering doctrine, or to 
give up on regulating the activity in question. 
When pcond spend and pno fed reg are small, commandeering (absent 
anticommandeering doctrine) and preemption are left as the only 
options, creating a potential tradeoff between lines of accountability 
and the exercise of state regulatory power.87 The threat that federal 
preemption—and thus the preemption-encouraging ban on 
commandeering—poses to state retention of regulatory control is 
significant not because state regulatory control is important for its 
own sake. Rather, the key point is that state regulatory autonomy is 
needed to realize the values that federalism is typically thought to 
advance, including accountability. That is, state regulatory autonomy 
remains critical no matter which of the commonly proffered virtues of 
federalism are under consideration.  
Specifically, tyranny prevention is said to be advanced when 
multiple levels of government compete for political power.88 
 
 86. One could complicate matters further by including a choice between commandeering 
and preemption. See infra Part IV.D. The text omits this potential option to simplify the 
exposition. The text could easily be adjusted to incorporate this alternative. 
 87. Thus the implications for political accountability of Professor Caminker’s 
commandeering categories, see supra note 82, are the opposite of their implications for state 
regulatory control. As Professor Jackson observes, “statutes that offer substantial discretion to 
the states in carrying out a substantial, federally mandated duty might pose a greater threat to 
the clarity of responsibility and thus to political accountability than do statutes imposing more 
limited, ministerial duties.” Jackson, supra note 12, at 2203-04. 
 88. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the principal benefit of 
the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power. The constitutionally mandated 
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers 
to ensure the protection of our fundamental liberties. . . . [A] healthy balance of power between 
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Democratic self-government is supposed to be facilitated when there 
exists a robust space for participatory politics at levels closer to the 
people who are governed.89 Political responsiveness and accountability 
are believed to be encouraged when states compete for mobile citizens 
who can vote with not just their hands but also their feet.90 Value 
pluralism is promoted when state policies are allowed to differ along 
various dimensions of cultural difference.91 Social problem solving can 
 
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front.” (internal citations omitted)); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742, 790 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur federal system provides a salutary check on 
governmental power.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In the compound republic of 
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, 
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. 
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control 
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From 
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 S. Ct. REV. 341, 380-
95. 
 89. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint sovereigns . . . . 
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes . . . .”); Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 789 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[F]ederalism enhances the 
opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative government. Alexis de Tocqueville 
understood well that participation in local government is a cornerstone of American democracy.”) 
(discussing 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 181 (H. Reeve trans., 1961)); 
Rapaczynski, supra note 88, at 395-408. 
       90.   See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint 
sovereigns . . . makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a 
mobile citizenry.”); ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 129-30 (2000) (analyzing 
the circumstances in which mobile citizens contribute to the efficient delivery of local public 
goods); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 
(1992) (arguing for competition among states); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The 
Political Economy of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 
1997) (providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an efficient allocation of 
citizens across jurisdictions); Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956) (providing the first formulation of the mobility problem). Responsiveness and 
accountability are interrelated because one way to ensure responsiveness is not through exit but 
through voice – i.e., voting politicians out of office or pressuring them. This is typically what is 
meant by accountability. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: 
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 91. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint 
sovereigns . . . assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society . . . .”). Contemporary examples abound, including some of the 
most controversial issues in American culture: abortion, gay marriage, and physician-assisted 
suicide. Whatever one thinks of value pluralism normatively regarding a particular issue, it is 
uncontroversial descriptively that uniform federal rules prevent different parts of the country 
from governing themselves in ways that vary across the nation. This is so regardless of whether 
the federal rule takes the form of: (1) a constitutional decision by the Court, see, e.g., Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); (2) a proposed constitutional amendment, see, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, 
Bush Calls for an Amendment Banning Same-Sex Nuptials, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, § 1, at 30 
(quoting President Bush as championing the amendment); or (3) a federal statute interpreted by 
the federal government to have broad preemptive effect, see, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 
904 (2006) (holding that the federal Controlled Substances Act does not permit the Attorney 
General to forbid doctors from prescribing federally regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted 
suicide under state law permitting the practice). 
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be encouraged when states are allowed to act as policy “laboratories.”92 
Finally, the efficient delivery of local public goods by states saves 
various costs when they make more cost-effective choices than the 
federal government would make for the nation as a whole.93 When 
federal preemption reduces state regulatory control—and thus the 
ability of states to make choices, including resource choices94—all of 
these federalism values can be compromised.95 
 
 92. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint 
sovereigns . . . allows for more innovation and experimentation in government . . . .”); Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 788-89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Courts and 
commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories for the 
development of new social, economic, and political ideas. This state innovation is no judicial 
myth.” (footnotes omitted)); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. 
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”). But see Rapaczynski, supra note 88, at 408-14 (criticizing the 
experimentation rationale for federalism). 
 93. For example, Rust Belt states favored national emissions standards for factories to 
reduce or eliminate a competitive advantage enjoyed by Sun Belt states in the competition for 
new industry. If the only standards were air quality standards, the Sun Belt states could offer 
less pollution control because their air was cleaner. So the Rust Belt states lobbied for a federal 
requirement that every new factory of a certain type had to install the same abatement 
technology. See generally B. Peter Pashigan, Environmental Protection: Whose Interests are Being 
Protected?, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551 (1985) (analyzing votes on critical Clean Air Act amendments 
and verifying that Rust Belt legislators voted to nationalize these rules); see also Robert 
Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 
54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 285 (1991) (observing that “when differential geographical 
benefits are at stake, congressional voting patterns fall out along remarkably congruent 
geographical lines, suggesting that congresspeople are aware of the legislation’s geographic 
implications, and that they vote consistently with the theory of pessimistic pluralism”). 
 94. See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1974) (stating that 
application of federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions will “significantly alter or 
displace the States’ abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire 
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. These 
activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual 
functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services. Indeed, it is functions 
such as these which governments are created to provide, services such as these which the States 
have traditionally afforded their citizens.”). 
 95. For recent discussions of the various values that federalism might be thought to serve, 
see STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 56-69 
(2005); DAVID SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA. L. REV. 903 (1994). For an overview 
of the normative federalism debate in American constitutional law and citations to the relevant 
literature, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-12 (2d ed. 2005). 
 Of course, legal and political debates about federalism are relevant beyond the United States 
and Europe, see infra Part II.E. Such debates are particularly significant in societies embroiled 
in ethnic conflict. For a fascinating study of the circumstances in which federalism can be 
employed as a structural technique to reduce ethnic conflict, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC 
GROUPS IN CONFLICT 597-98, 601-28 (1985) (showing how interethnic conflict may be reduced 
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This is well-trodden intellectual ground, and this inquiry does 
not take sides in the normative debate regarding the kinds of values 
that a federal system should secure. Rather, this inquiry maintains 
that state retention of regulatory control is needed to realize the 
commonly understood values advanced by federalism,96 and then 
argues that anticommandeering doctrine undermines federalism 
values by reducing state regulatory control insofar as a greater 
quantity of preemption results from the Court’s ban on 
commandeering. If direct federal regulation removes states from the 
regulatory scene, there is no meaningful sense in which they can 
prevent federal tyranny, advance political participation, encourage 
political responsiveness and accountability through interjurisdictional 
and intrajurisdictional competition, express the distinctive value 
commitments of the majority of their populations, serve as 
laboratories of experimentation, or efficiently deliver public goods. 
Accordingly, regardless of whether anticommandeering doctrine 
advances political accountability on balance, the extent to which 
states lose regulatory control is strongly associated with the extent to 
which the U.S. federal system can vindicate the other values typically 
thought to be advanced by federalism.97 
 
through dispersion and arrangement of the governmental structure so that intraethnic conflict is 
accentuated instead, and explaining the potential role of federalism in achieving these effects). 
 96. It is possible that state regulatory control could undermine federalism values in certain 
circumstances. For example, federal preemption might advance accountability to a greater extent 
than would state regulation if citizens were more attuned to the activities of their national 
representatives than to the conduct of their local ones. If nationalization were shown 
systematically to advance federalism values to a greater extent than state regulatory control, the 
argument advanced in this inquiry would unravel. Of course, defenders of anticommandeering 
doctrine, including the Court, are highly unlikely to conclude that the values typically associated 
with federalism would be better advanced without federalism than with it.  
 97. In response, one could invoke Professors Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley’s 
distinction between federalism as a constitutional requirement and the managerial concept of 
decentralization. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 95, at 910 (“Decentralization is a managerial 
concept; it refers to the delegation of centralized authority to subordinate units of either a 
geographic or a functional character.”). Even in a world without judicially enforced federalism, 
they argue, Congress and federal agencies could design experiments and try different approaches 
to social problems in different regions of the nation. Similarly, the federal government could 
preempt in such a way as to allow for regional participation, competition, expressions of value, 
and efficient delivery of local public goods. (Tyranny prevention is another matter because the 
central authority decides how much decentralization takes place in a world without federalism.) 
Professors Feeley and Rubin make some powerful political points and raise an intriguing 
theoretical possibility. But as the various federal laws discussed throughout this article 
illustrate, experience shows that regional experimentation and encouragement of participation, 
competition, diversity, and local efficiency are not what tends to happen when Congress 
preempts state and local law. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International 
Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1582 (2004) (“[I]t seems doubtful that the national 
government has the right incentives to decentralize when it should.”). This is not to say, 
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Of course, commandeering can trigger not just accountability 
concerns, but also concerns about some of the other federalism values 
discussed above. The Rehnquist Court stressed accountability,98 but 
that Court’s focus should not control a comparative normative analysis 
of commandeering and preemption from a federalism perspective. 
Theoretically, Congress could commandeer in ways that sap state 
regulatory control to as great an extent as would preemption. As a 
general matter, however, such equivalence seems unlikely.99 
Preemption bypasses the regulatory authority of the states; 
commandeering does not. Thus, when commandeering allows states to 
exercise discretion and make regulatory choices, a constitutional rule 
that categorically bans commandeering while allowing preemption 
with respect to the same subject matter makes little sense insofar as 
federalism is supposed to preserve state regulatory autonomy. 
The Court and commentators are correct that commandeering, 
particularly an unfunded mandate, requires states to devote their 
scarce resources to a particular issue while preemption leaves them 
free to redirect their resources elsewhere.100 But if our federal system 
would be better served if a state dedicated its time and money to Issue 
#1 but not to Issue #2, then it is not much consolation, when the 
federal government preempts regarding Issue #1, that the state can 
redirect its energies to addressing Issue #2. From a federalism 
perspective, it might be better if the state had been commandeered—
and funded by the federal government—regarding Issue #1. 
Furthermore, if the federal government preempted the states as much 
as constitutionally possible regarding all sorts of important problems, 
federalism would not be well served just because the states were free 
to commit their resources to the relatively trivial issues that 
remained. Commandeering with respect to the more important policy 
matters would likely be preferable.101 
When preemption is a feasible alternative, the relevant cost-
benefit questions for a federalism concerned with state regulatory 
control are: (1) whether anticommandeering doctrine causes the 
probability of federal regulation (pfed reg) to decline; (2) whether 
 
however, that Congress could not choose to do some significant decentralizing. Indeed, 
decentralization is a concept that is analytically connected to a central or national perspective. 
 98. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text (quoting New York). 
 99. It is also conceptually unclear how Congress could commandeer in ways that sap state 
regulatory control to a greater extent than preemption when both are available. See infra Part 
IV.E. 
 100. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 101. Cf. BREYER, supra note 95, at 59 (arguing that “the Court’s recent federalism decisions” 
such as New York and Printz “paradoxically threaten to shift regulatory activity from the state 
and local to the federal level—the likely opposite of their objective”). 
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anticommandeering doctrine causes the federalism costs of federal 
regulation (Cfed reg) to increase; and (3) whether it causes pfed reg to 
decline more than it causes Cfed reg to increase.102 As with many 
unresolved empirical questions, there is room for reasonable 
disagreement on this issue. But even pre-empirically, some important 
points can be made with some measure of confidence. 
To begin with, anticommandeering doctrine may cause pfed reg to 
decline little as a general matter. The doctrine, it is true, has taken 
away a congressional option, and having fewer options with which to 
accomplish a desired legislative objective should increase the costs of 
imposing federal regulations, at least in some circumstances. The 
upshot, theoretically, is less federal regulation. 
The problem with such reasoning, however, is that the federal 
government has numerous regulatory options at its disposal that 
anticommandeering doctrine leaves untouched, from preemption, to 
conditional federal spending, to giving states a choice between 
commandeering and preemption. It is unlikely that all of these 
alternatives would be significantly more expensive for the federal 
government to exercise in a particular situation than commandeering 
would be. 
Moving from financial to accountability costs, it is difficult to 
think of an instance in which Congress chose the commandeering 
option with the intent or effect of externalizing political accountability 
to a greater extent than exists when Congress regulates in some other 
way. Nor is it straightforward conceptually to envision how Congress 
could pursue such a course with any confidence that it would succeed 
in “getting away with it.” If this is right, then requiring the federal 
government to preempt (or regulate some other way) rather than to 
commandeer—which the federal government has almost always 
chosen to do voluntarily anyway103—does not lower pfed reg to a 
significant extent, at least in many situations. 
The claim that the probability of federal regulation is relatively 
insensitive to the form that it takes raises some interesting questions. 
First, it may not be apparent why the federal government would ever 
choose to commandeer. Two possibilities, discussed further below in 
 
 102. When preemption is not a feasible alternative (and the Court bans commandeering), the 
federalism costs imposed by mandatory federal regulation are irrelevant because the probability 
of such federal regulation goes to zero. 
 103. In Printz, Justice Scalia observed for the majority that historically Congress has not 
engaged in commandeering. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 989, 907 (1997). See supra text 
accompanying note 56. For Justice Scalia, this historical lesson indicated that commandeering is 
unconstitutional. Ironically, his observation may suggest that anticommandeering doctrine does 
not advance federalism values to a significant extent because the doctrine does not appreciably 
lower the probability of federal regulation. 
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Parts III and IV, respectively, are that (1) the states sometimes prefer 
commandeering to preemption, and they influence the federal 
legislative process to this end, and (2) preemption is not always a 
feasible alternative in the short run. Second, the suggestion that 
anticommandeering doctrine causes the probability of federal 
regulation to decline little may seem empirically suspect because 
Congress did not impose a preemptive solution after New York.104 But 
what happened ex post regarding the legislative problem reviewed in 
New York or any other case proves nothing one way or the other. The 
argument advanced by this inquiry is not that the Court should allow 
commandeering with respect to issue X because otherwise Congress 
will likely respond by preempting state action regarding issue X. 
There are any number of reasons why a future Congress might not 
(re)turn its attention to issue X: for example, different priorities, 
resources, or members. The point, rather, is that if Congress knows it 
cannot commandeer under any circumstances, ex ante it will be more 
likely to preempt state and local regulations in enacting future laws 
regarding issues X, Y, and Z. 
Even if anticommandeering doctrine does not lower the 
probability of federal regulation (pfed reg) to a significant extent because 
the federal government will preempt (or regulate some other way) 
rather than commandeer, the question remains whether preemption, 
as compared with commandeering, imposes greater federalism costs 
(Cfed reg) in the form of lost regulatory control than it potentially saves 
states in terms of both accountability and scarce financial resources.105 
 
 104. See, e.g., U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, OUR GOVERNING LEGISLATION, LOW-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985, http://www.nrc.gov/who-we-
are/governing-laws.html#llrwpaa-1985 (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (“This Act gives States the 
responsibility to dispose of low-level radioactive waste generated within their borders . . . .”); 
CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS IB92059: CIVILIAN NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL, July 30, 2001, 
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Waste/waste-
2.cfm?&CFID=569153&CFTOKEN=46244765#_1_19 (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (“Disposal of 
low-level radioactive waste, which generally consists of low concentrations of relatively short-
lived radionuclides, is a state responsibility under the 1980 Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Act and 1985 amendments.”). 
 105. Typically, the financial costs to the states associated with preemption are lower than 
the costs associated with commandeering because states incur implementation costs only when 
they are commandeered. Commandeering requires states to devote state resources to federal 
priorities; preemption usually prevents states from using their resources in federally prohibited 
ways. Preemption, however, imposes greater costs on states than does commandeering in certain 
circumstances. Preemption can impose significant costs on the states if they must meet 
burdensome federal standards in pursuing their activities in areas where these activities are also 
performed by private individuals. Examples might include operating cars or running a utility. 
Imagine two possibilities: (1) Congress requires the states to decrease pollution by X amount; or 
(2) Congress imposes standards for pollution control that require the most expensive abatement 
technology, standards that are far more costly than states would be allowed to choose under (1). 
Even when states are not market participants, moreover, preemption can impose significant 
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This is an important empirical question, the answer to which likely 
depends on the circumstances.106 Yet it is a striking feature of the 
contemporary anticommandeering doctrine that the Court does not 
pause to consider these dimensions of the problem. Indeed, the the 
Court’s ban on commandeering is so broad,107 so context insensitive, 
that it applies not just in the face of a compelling government interest 
(for example, commandeering of state and local officials in the wake of 
a terrorist attack or devastating hurricane).108 The ban also applies 
when accountability concerns are minimal (perhaps because Congress, 
the states, and the media have taken steps to clarify the extent to 
which the federal government is in charge), and when preemption 
would impose huge costs on the states relative to commandeering, 
both financially and in terms of lost regulatory control. This does not 
seem a sensible outcome to the extent that the animating purpose of 
anticommandeering doctrine is (or should be) the federalist enterprise 
of protecting state autonomy. 
D. Conditional Federal Spending 
Unlike preemption or commandeering, Congress’s use of its 
conditional spending power—conditioning federal funds on the 
agreement of the states to be commandeered—does not constitute a 
 
costs on them. Imagine that after New York, Congress enacted super-strict waste storage 
requirements, and no private business could afford to comply with them. States with such 
businesses in their jurisdictions would then have to spend money to subsidize them, or else 
would risk losing them and all of the associated tax revenue, jobs, and other economic benefits–
either because the businesses would leave for another jurisdiction or would have to shut down. 
 106. It is one thing to call a question “empirical” and another to resolve it with empirical 
evidence. It is difficult, if not impossible, to investigate rigorously the extent to which 
anticommandeering doctrine advances or thwarts the vindication of federalism values in various 
circumstances. The chief obstacles lie in calculating the relevant probabilities and in deriving a 
common metric according to which the various costs can be compared. Financial costs are by 
definition measured in monetary terms, but the problem of monetizing accountability and 
regulatory-control costs seems intractable as a general matter. The analyst cannot ask states 
how much they would be willing to pay to avoid accountability or to retain regulatory control. 
Nor are the preferences of state officers the relevant concern. See infra Part IV.B. The most that 
can be hoped for empirically in light of the inevitable lack of knowledge is the context-sensitive, 
rough balancing of incommensurable values that is typical of doctrinal analysis in constitutional 
law. Regardless, anticommandeering doctrine would be improved if the Court took all of the 
relevant costs into account, not just political accountability. In cases in which the record is 
particularly clear, moreover, empirical problems will not pose a serious difficulty to sound 
constitutional analysis of the relevant considerations. See infra Part III (discussing New York). 
 107. For a discussion of “breadth” and “depth” as characteristics of judicial decision making, 
see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory In Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at 
the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2005) (analyzing Sunstein’s theory of judicial 
minimalism). 
 108. See infra Part V. 
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mandatory form of federal regulation. States, in other words, may 
avoid being commandeered by turning down the money. As noted 
above,109 Justice O’Connor stressed for the New York Court that 
Congress may place strings on federal grants in the commandeering 
context. 
Although Justice O’Connor distinguished conditional spending 
from commandeering on grounds of coercion and thus 
accountability,110 commentators have debated vigorously whether 
many forms of conditional federal spending are actually mandatory in 
practice because the Rehnquist Court declined to put teeth into Dole’s 
non-coercion requirement.111 To the extent one believes that particular 
uses of the conditional spending power are non-coercive, so that states 
have a reasonable choice in deciding whether to accept or to turn down 
federal dollars, it may not seem apparent how putting strings on 
federal money might compromise accountability values as much as 
commandeering. While commandeering leaves states with no choice, a 
state can turn down a conditional grant and thereby avoid being 
commandeered. 
One response to this point regarding accountability is to reject 
the premise and to maintain that state officials have no reasonable 
choice but to accept large quantities of federal money in many 
situations, so that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York draws 
distinctions often without a relevant real-world difference. For 
example, no state realistically could afford to give up highway money 
from the government in Dole.112 Certain conditions can be quite 
coercive; it is extraordinarily difficult to draw a line beyond which a 
condition becomes coercive, and thus conditional spending can be as 
coercive as commandeering or preemption. 
 
 109. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 110. Coercion and accountability are related in that state officials are appropriately held 
accountable for accepting conditional federal grants if and only if they had a choice in the 
matter–that is, they were not coerced into accepting the conditions in order to get the money. If 
coercion exists, conditional spending may give the false impression of a choice. What it means for 
state officials to “have a choice in the matter” is a nettlesome question. Must the choice be 
merely possible or must it also be rational, reasonable, or something more demanding? 
 111. See generally Siegel, supra note 3 (collecting exemplary sources that take different 
positions on this issue); see also supra note 51 (stating the non-coercion requirement). 
 112. See Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental 
Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 160-61 (2001) (“As a practical matter, states will not 
reject large sums of money offered by Congress unless the conditions are unduly repressive. . . . 
South Dakota, Nevada, and Virginia sued to invalidate conditions attached to the receipt of 
federal highway trust funds. However, upon losing their suits, the states promptly complied with 
the conditions. Federal funds trumped state principles.” (footnotes omitted)); supra note 51 
(discussing Dole). 
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From a federalism perspective, however, a potentially crucial 
difference exists between conditional federal spending on the one hand 
and commandeering or preemption on the other. This difference 
concerns relative financial and opportunity costs.113 With conditional 
federal spending, states “get paid” in exchange for their agreement to 
be commandeered. To the extent that conditional spending pays the 
costs of federal regulation, it avoids the problem of displacing state 
and local budget choices underscored by the Court in National League 
of Cities.114 With commandeering or preemption, by contrast, states 
may face an unfunded mandate and may thus have to forgo other 
regulatory priorities.115 
There does not seem to be much difference between conditional 
spending and commandeering in terms of regulatory control. This is 
because under conditional spending the federal government gives the 
money in exchange for the states’ agreement to be commandeered. A 
difference exists only to the extent one views state choices between the 
money and the commandeering as itself an exercise of regulatory 
control. Moving beyond the commandeering context and considering 
conditional grants in general, the degree of state regulatory control 
depends on the specificity with which Congress sets the conditions. 
Conditions can be general and leave great flexibility (for example, “set 
a reasonable speed limit”), or they can be specific (for example, “set a 
55 mph speed limit”). The amount of regulatory control retained by 
states depends on the type of condition established. 
Overall, the relative impact of conditional spending from a 
federalism perspective depends on context, and it would be perilous to 
attempt a rank ordering of different forms of federal regulation 
according to their impact on federalism values. Based on the foregoing 
analysis of the conditional spending power, the most that can be said 
in general is that the Court has shown too much concern about 
accountability in the commandeering context and arguably too little 
concern about accountability when federal regulation takes the form of 
conditional spending. In addition, the Court has undermined 
federalism values by paying essentially no attention to the relative 
impact of different forms of federal regulation on state budgets and 
decision making capabilities. Thus, the Court’s general categories 
distinguishing permissible from impermissible kinds of federal 
legislation do not withstand a functional analysis grounded in the 
values typically associated with federalism. 
 
 113. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 66, 105 and accompanying text. 
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E. A Transnational Comparison 
The federalism consequences of reduced regulatory control at 
the state level are borne out by the European experience. The general 
view of member states of the European Union on commandeering is 
the opposite of the U.S. Supreme Court’s position:116 member states 
tend to prefer directives to regulations. Directives “command a 
Member State to regulate in a particular area and thus require 
further Member State legislative action to become fully effective 
within that state,” while regulations “have immediate legal force for 
individuals within a Member State.”117 The European judgment is that 
directives leave member states with more regulatory power.118 In a 
relatively rare instance of comparative analysis on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Justice Breyer flagged this perceived virtue of commandeering 
across the Atlantic: 
At least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that local 
control is better maintained through application of a principle that is the direct opposite 
of the principle the majority derives from the silence of our Constitution. The federal 
systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide 
that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of 
the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central “federal” body. . . . They do 
so in part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the 
independent authority of the “state,” member nation, or other subsidiary government, 
and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.119 
 
 116. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of 
Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 800, 801 (2004) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment 
decisions “stand in striking contrast to the analogous doctrines of the European Court of 
Justice,” and exploring some of the “reasons for welcoming ‘commandeering’ in the European 
Union but not in the United States”). 
 117. Halberstam, supra note 14, at 214-15 (“In the European Union, by contrast [to the 
United States], the subject of concern is not Union action that ‘commandeers’ Member State 
legislative or administrative bodies, but EU legislative activity that has direct effect in the legal 
systems of the Member States. Member States tend not to welcome Community regulations, 
which have immediate legal force for individuals within a Member State, and instead prefer that 
the Community pass directives, which command a Member State to regulate in a particular area 
and thus require further Member State legislative action to become fully effective within that 
state. So, too, ‘commandeering’ is a basic feature of German federalism . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
See also COOTER, supra note 90, at 236 (discussing the difference between directives and 
regulations in the law of the European Union). 
 118. Technically, both directives and regulations qualify as forms of “commandeering” under 
Printz because most regulations in the European Union must be enforced by member state 
institutions. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 14, at 213. Note, moreover, that even if one were to 
dispute Professor Halberstam’s empirical judgment about member-state preferences, the key 
point would remain that both directives and regulations are legal in the European Union. 
 119. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declined Justice Breyer’s 
invitation to look abroad, deeming “such comparative analysis 
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution.”120 
Of course, dabbling in comparative law by contrasting legal 
regimes briefly and at a high level of abstraction does not definitively 
clarify the wisdom of current Tenth Amendment doctrine. Justice 
Breyer rightly recognized that “we are interpreting our own 
Constitution, and not those of other nations, and there may be 
relevant political and structural differences between their systems 
and our own.”121 Indeed, Daniel Halberstam’s analysis of institutional 
dynamics in the United States and the European Union helps to 
account for their opposite approaches to commandeering: 
The US anti-commandeering rule exists in the context of a federal system marked by 
independently constituted, independently competent levels of governance that 
coexist . . . with a powerful federal government whose sphere of influence has proven 
difficult to contain by other means. Here, the anti-commandeering rule may be viewed 
as a consensus-forcing device by separating independent tiers of governance and 
requiring federal and State decision makers to reach agreement before working 
together.122 
According to Professor Halberstam, the legal and political 
culture in Europe is different: 
[T]he EU and Germany have both preserved . . . limitations on central government 
expansion and mechanisms of component State control over central government norms. 
Constitutional provisions and practical realities in both the EU and Germany make the 
central governing structure in both systems dependent on the component States for 
administrative services. And in both systems, component States are represented in their 
corporate capacities in the central governing institutions. Thus, in the EU and in 
Germany, commandeering is embedded within a system of consensus-forcing governance 
with structural limitations on the expansion of the central government. . . . 
[C]ommandeering may be viewed as a further mechanism to maintain the dependence of 
the central government on the component States and to preserve a sphere for additional 
component State input while carrying out central commands.123 
The political safeguards of federalism are more present in Europe 
than they are here.124 
Moreover, the directive in European Union law (1) refers only 
to commandeered legislation, not to executive action, as was at issue 
 
 120. Id. at 921 n.11. 
 121. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 122. Halberstam, supra note 14, at 249. 
 123. Id. at 249-50 (footnote omitted). 
 124. See Mark Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Comparative Constitutional Law in Basic 
Constitutional Law Courses, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 671, 677 (2005) (recharacterizing Professor 
Halberstam’s findings in terms of “the political safeguards of federalism” and suggesting that 
“Justice Breyer’s comments on German federalism [in Printz] can be used to enter a note of 
caution about relying on bottom-line results without paying attention to the larger institutional 
surrounding”). 
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in Printz; (2) is specifically provided for in the European Union Treaty; 
(3) is the only available instrument in some areas; and (4) is partly 
justified by the very different doctrinal structures that characterize 
the legal regimes of member states. Directives enable them to realize 
given policy goals in a variety of legal systems, a concern less relevant 
in the United States because differences among state laws are more 
substantive and less doctrinal (perhaps excepting Louisiana).125 
Accordingly, there exists a stronger textual basis for legislative 
commandeering in the European Union than in the United States and 
a greater need for state-level flexibility. Such wrinkles, however, do 
not detract from Justice Breyer’s suggestion that the European 
“experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the 
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem.”126 
Professor Halberstam’s examination of commandeering in Europe 
verifies that commandeering affords states greater regulatory control 
than does preemption.127 
III. REVISITING NEW YORK AND PRINTZ 
It is instructive to analyze New York and Printz according to 
the foregoing analysis of anticommandeering doctrine. The key 
question is whether the Court’s holdings make sense from a 
federalism perspective when assessed according to their impact on the 
probability of federal regulation, state regulatory control, political 
accountability, and financial costs. 
Based upon these criteria, the Court in New York was myopic 
in its focus on accountability and it decided the case incorrectly even 
on accountability grounds. Of course, New York is a familiar case by 
now. But Justice White’s dissent warrants attention, even at this late 
date, because familiarity may tend to facilitate forgetfulness. Justice 
White reported that the legislation at issue “resulted from the efforts 
of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of remedies to the waste 
problem. They sought not federal preemption or intervention, but 
 
 125. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 14, at 213-14, 230-31. 
 126. Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 127. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 14, at 247-48 (“[P]roviding the central government 
with the legal tools and practical powers to take independent action might . . . introduce a bias in 
favour of centralization. Central-component system relations might atrophy and the central 
government might come to rely increasingly on its own resources. . . . [T]he anti-commandeering 
rule might have perverse effects, by prodding the central government to develop the bureaucracy 
necessary to implement its policy without involving the component States. Where the central 
government has the capacity to do this and expands central functions, the central infrastructure 
might short-circuit what would have otherwise become a productive cooperative relationship 
with component States.” (footnote omitted)). 
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rather congressional sanction of interstate compromises they had 
reached.” The National Governors’ Association (“NGA”) “recognized 
that the Federal Government could assert its preeminence in 
achieving a solution to this problem, but requested instead that 
Congress oversee state-developed regional solutions.”128 Justice White 
noted that the Senate had considered “a ‘federal’ solution” in July 
1980. 
The 1980 legislation, however, did not dispose of the matter (so 
to speak) because of continuing interstate disputes: 
[A]ttempts by states to enter into compacts and to gain congressional approval sparked 
a new round of political squabbling between elected officials from unsited States, who 
generally opposed ratification of the compacts that were being formed, and their 
counterparts from the [still only three] sited States, who insisted that the promises 
made in the 1980 Act be honored. . . . [T]he [NGA] organized more than a dozen 
meetings to achieve a state consensus. 
. . . A movement thus arose to achieve a compromise between the sited and the unsited 
States, in which the sited States agreed to continue accepting waste in exchange for the 
imposition of stronger measures to guarantee compliance with the unsited States’ 
assurances that they would develop alternative disposal facilities. . . . In sum, the 1985 
Act was very much the product of cooperative federalism, in which the States bargained 
among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to sanction.129 
As Justice White discussed, New York was an unsited state 
that exported large amounts of low-level radioactive waste to sited 
states. It took various actions that signified its approval of the 
interstate negotiations and that allowed it to reap substantial benefits 
from the ensuing bargain.130 
Despite the empirical problems that impede a cost-benefit 
inquiry in this area of constitutional law,131 the facts of New York 
mitigate these problems. The probability of federal regulation was not 
sensitive to the issue of commandeering versus preemption or some 
other regulatory alternative. The problem was pressing, and Congress 
was going to act one way or the other. Indeed, the states had to 
persuade Congress not to engage in preemption and instead to impose 
 
 128. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 189-92 (White, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 129. Id. at 192-94 (internal citations omitted). See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The 
Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 
541-42 (1997) (“In New York . . . , the record of state participation in resolving an ongoing 
problem at a national level through legislation to which states as such significantly contributed 
is clear. There can be little doubt that the ‘safeguards of the federal structure’ were in play there, 
if they ever can be said to be in play.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 130. New York, 505 U.S. at 196-99 (White, J., dissenting) (documenting various statements 
and actions by New York officials signifying the state’s agreement with the efforts of the NGA 
and the federal legislation that resulted). 
 131. See supra note 106. 
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a commandeering sanction in the 1985 Act (among other measures) as 
a way of disciplining unsited states, which had not lived up to their 
promises.132 Although New York stopped supporting the 
commandeering approach when its strategic situation changed ex 
post, New York had approved it ex ante.133 
Turning from the probability of federal regulation to the 
various costs imposed on the states by federal regulation, two points 
are apparent. First, while the commandeering at issue imposed 
substantial liabilities on the states, the commandeering arrangement 
reflected the states’ desire to retain regulatory control, which was why 
they repeatedly asked Congress to stay its (concededly constitutional) 
preemptive hand. Absent a threat of federal preemption (the worst 
possible outcome from the states’ perspective), the states apparently 
believed that a commandeering lever was needed to ensure compliance 
with any interstate agreement, and thus to secure an agreement. 
Second, there was little prospect of public confusion or the imposition 
of undeserved accountability on the states because the states approved 
the agreement formalized by Congress. 
One could insist that the views of most state officials in the 
interstate interactions leading up to New York are irrelevant because 
Tenth Amendment doctrine does not exist for the sake of state officials 
or even states; rather, federalism values serve the long-term liberty 
and self-government interests of our nation’s citizens.134 On this view, 
it does not matter that state officials may not care about 
accountability, and indeed may try to evade accountability.135 
But this generalization is far removed from the realities on the 
ground in New York. The states wanted regulatory control, and they 
were not trying to evade the political accountability that ought to 
come with it. It seems a difficult task to construct a federalism 
argument that removing the states from the regulatory scene through 
preemption would have been preferable. A citizen of New York who 
observed that her state was building a waste facility or taking title to 
 
 132. It is, of course, possible that Congress would not have passed preemptive legislation in 
the event that a state-proposed solution failed to be enacted. Congress might not have acted on a 
preemption threat for any number of reasons. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. But 
the threat of preemption in New York does appear to have been real. See supra note 128 and 
accompanying text. 
 133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra notes 35, 88 and accompanying text. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (“The 
Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state 
governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing 
the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state 
governments for the protection of individuals.”). 
 135. See infra Part IV.B. 
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low-level radioactive waste would not be wrongly inferring that the 
state was responsible for the regulatory action. New York was author 
of this regulatory action in the real sense that New York had sought, 
approved, and reaped the benefits of the interstate negotiation process 
that resulted in the commandeering.136 This is why Justice White 
thought “[t]he State should be estopped from asserting the 
unconstitutionality of a provision that seeks merely to ensure that, 
after deriving substantial advantages from the 1985 Act, New York in 
fact must live up to its bargain by establishing an in-state low-level 
radioactive waste facility or assuming liability for its failure to act.”137 
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor argued that 
accountability concerns cut decisively in the opposite direction.138 As 
explained immediately above, the level of abstraction at which she 
cast her accountability analysis renders her conclusion vulnerable. 
More problematic, however, was her failure to recognize the other 
considerations relevant to the Tenth Amendment inquiry: the ex ante 
probability of federal regulation, the federalism costs of forgone state 
regulatory control, and the financial costs imposed by federal 
regulation. The Court did not recognize, let alone adequately defend, 
the apparent constitutional lesson of New York: accountability 
concerns (as the Court sees them) are so important that they trump 
not only the states’ ex ante desire for accountability, but also the other 
determinants of whether a commandeering ban advances or 
undermines the values of federalism. 
 
 136. One might respond that New York’s executive had helped to broker the deal, but New 
York’s legislature would have born the electoral consequences of compliance because it was 
required to identify and authorize a site within the state on which to build a waste facility. This 
point, however, does seem a distinction without a decisive difference. New York, through its duly 
elected representative, brokered an interstate deal and agreed to a certain way of dealing with 
certain nuclear wastes. There is no reason to assume that only the state legislature could give 
this consent. Such a requirement, moreover, would be unrealistic. The kind of interstate 
negotiation and solution at issue in New York required the actions of state executives. Finally, 
there is no indication that the New York legislature thought differently about the issue at the 
time that the state executive acted. And if the legislature did in fact have a different view of the 
matter, it could have voiced its disapproval publicly and told the electorate as much. 
 137. New York, 505 U.S. at 198-99 (White, J., dissenting). By contrast, Professor Jackson 
argues that, “[i]n view of the length of time between enactment and imposition of the most severe 
penalties, the scheme [in New York] created a significant risk that federal officials would receive 
credit for solving a problem while passing the politically unpleasant decisions on to the states.” 
Jackson, supra note 12, at 2203. Professor Jackson’s description, like Justice O’Connor’s, 
proceeds from the assumption that the states, including New York, bore no responsibility for the 
federal legislation. As discussed above, however, the states in New York were as responsible for 
the law as was the federal government. It is therefore not clear wherein the accountability 
problem lay. 
 138. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
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New York provides another analytical lesson, which Justice 
White implicitly identified: 
[T]he practical effect of New York’s position is that because it is unwilling to honor its 
obligations to provide in-state storage facilities for its low-level radioactive waste, other 
States with such plants must accept New York’s waste, whether they wish to or not. 
Otherwise, the many economically and socially beneficial producers of such waste in the 
State would have to cease their operations. The Court’s refusal to force New York to 
accept responsibility for its own problem inevitably means that some other State’s 
sovereignty will be impinged by its being forced, for public health reasons, to accept New 
York’s low-level radioactive waste. I do not understand the principle of federalism to 
impede the National Government from acting as referee among the States to prohibit 
one from bullying another.139 
Justice White over claimed, because the implication of the majority’s 
position was not that other states had to accept New York’s waste. The 
other remedies, including federally sanctioned border closings, 
remained in place. But the larger point remains: it can be 
oversimplified to conceive constitutional federalism questions as 
involving a power struggle between the federal government and “the 
states.” Likewise, it can be oversimplified to ask whether 
anticommandeering doctrine makes “the states” better or worse off in 
various situations. In New York, the unsited states were the 
immediate beneficiaries of the Court’s decision, while the three sited 
states and Congress were the short-term losers. Yet over the long run, 
it is difficult to see how “the states” were made better off by the 
decision in New York, which likely rendered them less able to make 
credible commitments to one another in the face of collective action 
problems, and which may have left Congress less willing to stay its 
regulatory hand in the future by forgoing preemption.140 
 
 139. New York, 505 U.S. at 199 (White, J., dissenting). As of October 2006, New York 
remained one of only six states (plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) that had not 
entered into a regional compact. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, LOW-LEVEL 
WASTE COMPACTS, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/compacts.html (last visited Oct. 12, 
2006). 
 140. Accord Caminker, supra note 14, at 1013 (In New York, “[e]ach state preferred to wait 
and hope that its neighbor built a disposal site on which it could ‘free ride.’ To transcend this 
prisoners’ dilemma, the states proposed a cooperative solution and sought congressional 
enforcement to preclude defections. The congressional mandate of state action thus sought 
merely to empower states to achieve self-generated objectives.” (footnote omitted)); Young, supra 
note 72, at 113 (“The federal law at issue in New York . . . reinforced state-level policy efforts to 
agree on shared responsibilities for radioactive waste disposal by providing a federal 
enforcement mechanism. In this sense, federal action reduced constraints on state autonomy by 
removing collective action impediments to state-level policymaking. . . . Recognition of the 
anticommandeering rule in New York thwarted a national effort, supported by most states, to 
help solve the difficult collective action problem of nuclear waste disposal. . . . [N]ational action 
can sometimes empower state governments, and federalism doctrine needs to be sufficiently 
flexible to address that possibility.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Justice White’s exclamation to the effect that “this is madness; 
the states wanted this!” misses a more fundamental objection to the 
outcome in New York: regardless of what the states wanted, 
commandeering was more protective of federalism values than was 
the regulatory alternative in play—preemption.141 A persuasive 
accountability argument in favor of the Court’s holding in New York 
must explain why accountability problems potentially associated with 
commandeering are so weighty that they trump the core federalist 
priority of preserving state regulatory autonomy. Without state 
retention of significant regulatory control, federalism cannot realize 
its goals of preventing federal tyranny, promoting political 
participation, encouraging responsiveness and accountability, 
allowing expressions of value pluralism, providing state laboratories of 
experimentation, and facilitating the efficient delivery of local public 
goods.142 
New York is arguably a stronger kind of Tenth Amendment 
case than Printz from the standpoint of symbolic federalism and 
political accountability values, at least if one abstracts away from the 
particular facts of New York. Commandeering state legislatures and 
forcing them to enact laws may constitute more of an intrusion and 
infringement on state sovereign “dignity” than asking state law 
enforcement personnel merely to enforce a federal law on an interim 
basis.143 In the New York scenario, moreover, the inquiring citizen 
would need to determine not only which sovereign was seeking to 
control her behavior, but also whether one sovereign was forcing the 
other sovereign to control her behavior through legislation. No such 
informational complications exist in the Printz situation, where it 
would be clear upon inquiry that the governing law is federal.144 These 
differences may explain why many constitutional lawyers seem to 
 
 141. See supra text accompanying note 129  (discussing Congress’ consideration of a 
preemptive solution to the interstate waste problem). 
 142. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
 143. See infra Conclusion for a discussion of the role played by symbolism in the Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence. 
 144. The two kinds of cases are more difficult to distinguish on financial grounds, because 
compelling states to enforce federal laws can also require states to expend scarce and potentially 
significant state resources. On the other hand, state courts are required to hear federal claims, 
and state executive officers must enforce state-court decisions vindicating federal rights. See New 
York, 505 U.S. at 178-79 (“[T]his sort of federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text 
of the Supremacy Clause.”); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). Both of these requirements are 
costly, yet are allowed under the Court’s anticommandeering doctrine. 
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agree that New York involved the stronger Tenth Amendment 
challenge.145 
From the standpoint of state regulatory control, however, 
Printz is on firmer constitutional ground. As noted in Part II, 
anticommandeering doctrine will not impede the realization of 
federalism values when preemption is not reasonably available, 
because the federal government will be just as unable to preempt as to 
commandeer. The way preemption would work in New York is 
straightforward: Congress could use its commerce power to dictate to 
public and private owners of the waste how to dispose of the waste. 
These congressional rules would preempt any other rules or 
regulations. Then, if a waste storage crisis ensued because of 
insufficient facilities around the country, states wanting businesses 
that generated the waste to operate within their jurisdictions would 
have to build storage facilities for waste that could not be moved out of 
state. Otherwise, the businesses would have to move elsewhere or stop 
operating.146 
But Congress would have to do more than trump local laws 
regarding background checks for preemption to succeed in Printz. 
Because the absence of an instantly available computer database 
made it impossible for Congress to require licensed gun dealers to 
abide by the federal regulation directly, the federal government would 
immediately have had to establish a large bureaucracy in order to 
 
 145. When Printz was pending before the Supreme Court, for example, Acting Solicitor 
General Walter Dellinger argued that the decisive Tenth Amendment objections to the federal 
law in New York had no relevance to the Brady Act: 
The Brady Act provisions at issue here stand in marked contrast to those struck down 
in New York. The law invalidated in New York was a “command [to] state government 
to enact state regulation” (either by legislation or administrative initiative) to deal with 
the problems of radioactive waste. 505 U.S. at 178 (emphasis in original). In 
distinction, the Brady Act represents a clearly articulated congressional solution to the 
problems posed by handgun violence, especially insufficiently effective regulation of 
handgun transfers between private parties. The Brady Act does not require [Chief Law 
Enforcement Officers] to make policy; rather, . . . the Act only requires state officials to 
assist in the application of federal law to private parties in the course of their ordinary 
duties. The Brady Act is therefore not an impermissible command to the States to 
promulgate laws or regulations, but an unobjectionable requirement that officials 
assist in “congressional regulation of individuals.” New York, 505 U.S. at 178. 
Brief for the United States at 22, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-
1503), 1996 WL 595005. This history suggests that ex ante, the Government viewed New York as 
expressing a smaller principle than did Printz as eventually handed down by the Court.  
 146. Cf. supra note 105 (discussing related issues). 
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conduct the checks. This costly prospect would have substantially 
reduced the probability of mandatory federal regulation.147 
Printz is thus more defensible than New York from the 
perspective of state regulatory control. In his opinion for the Court in 
Printz, Justice Scalia recognizes this point, and he appears 
unwittingly to concede the independent importance of regulatory 
control when he distinguishes New York: 
Even assuming, moreover, that the Brady Act leaves no “policymaking” discretion with 
the States, we fail to see how that improves rather than worsens the intrusion upon 
state sovereignty. Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous political 
entities is arguably less undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain fields 
than . . . by “reduc[ing] [them] to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.” It is an essential 
attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and 
autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.148 
In light of the disciplined formalism that otherwise pervades his 
opinion for the Court, this implicitly functional judgment is 
noteworthy. 
The foregoing assessment of Printz is a relative one. The 
suggestion is not that Printz was decided correctly. Rather, the 
argument is that, on grounds of relative regulatory control, Printz is 
more defensible than New York from a federalism perspective if one 
accepts anticommandeering, at least in some instances, as sound 
constitutional doctrine. Whether Printz adequately accounts for the 
interests of the national government is a distinct question. It is also 
unclear in Printz how accountability costs trade off with the other 
federalism costs imposed by federal regulation: loss of regulatory 
control and financial costs. On the one hand, preemption does not 
seem to have been a feasible possibility in the short run,149 and the 
statute allowed states to exercise no real measure of regulatory 
control. On the other hand, the expense borne by the states in 
carrying out the federal mandate seemed modest.150 But the upshot of 
 
 147. Use of the conditional federal spending power would have remained an option. See 
supra notes 3, 51 and accompanying text; supra Part II.D (analyzing the conditional spending 
power from a federalism perspective). 
 148. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923, 928 (1997) (internal citation omitted). 
 149. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying note 147 
(discussing the costliness of performing background checks). 
 150. In Printz, the Solicitor General underscored the minimal nature of the burden that the 
Brady Act imposed on the states: 
The text of the Brady Act requires only that CLEOs [Chief Law Enforcement Officers] 
make a “reasonable effort” to conduct the record check, and the Act affords CLEOs 
broad discretion to determine the scope of that “reasonable effort,” in light of their 
own resources and law enforcement priorities. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, which administers the Brady Act, has made clear in its guidance 
interpreting the Act that it is generally “reasonable” for CLEOs to choose to fulfill 
their duties by consulting readily accessible criminal records. Thus, in light of their 
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the balancing analysis depends on how much one values 
accountability as a constitutional concern in this setting, and the 
extent to which one believes that the Brady Act compromised political 
accountability, even though local law enforcement officers could have 
simply informed would-be firearms purchasers that the federal 
government was requiring them to conduct the background checks.151 
Regardless, the Court should have addressed all of the relevant 
considerations discussed above before imposing a broad and deep 
anticommandeering rule in the name of the Constitution’s 
commitment to federalism.152 
IV. ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS 
This Part addresses various potential objections to the 
argument advanced in this Article. First, an unsympathetic 
commentator could argue that the foregoing “functional” analysis 
sounds in politics or public policy, not constitutional law. Second, a 
critic might submit that if the foregoing analysis is correct, there 
would be no Tenth Amendment litigation because the states would 
perform the cost-benefit tradeoff themselves and they would have no 
interest in rendering themselves worse off. Third, a federalist could 
object that the real problem here is not anticommandeering doctrine, 
but the Supreme Court’s failure to limit preemption as an alternative 
to commandeering. Fourth, one might insist that the Court has gotten 
the doctrine exactly right from a federalism perspective because 
Congress may give states the choice between commandeering and 
preemption, and this option is clearly preferable to allowing 
commandeering as well. Fifth, a critic might suggest that conditional 
federal spending or another cooperative arrangement is more likely to 
result than is preemption when Congress would like to commandeer 
 
limited resources and competing obligations, CLEOs can and do meet their obligations 
by having clerical personnel perform checks of criminal records to the extent possible 
given the circumstances. The other requirements imposed on CLEOs under the Act 
are even more clearly de minimis. 
Brief for the United States at 12, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-
1503), 1996 WL 595005. Yet the federal government would have been on stronger ground if it 
had paid for the background checks of potential firearms purchasers. See supra note 66 and 
accompanying text (arguing that an unfunded mandate compromises federalism values to a 
greater extent than a funded mandate). 
 151. To alleviate accountability concerns, Congress might have required the transmission of 
such information to potential purchasers and perhaps also mandated the posting of visible signs 
in gun stores indicating that background checks were mandated by federal statute, not state or 
local law. 
 152. See supra note 107 (referencing discussions of “breadth” and “depth” as characteristics 
of judicial decision making); Siegel, supra note 107, at 1966 (characterizing New York and Printz 
as “relatively broad and deep”). 
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the states but the Court prohibits it from doing so. Sixth, a defender of 
anticommandeering doctrine could argue that accountability concerns, 
by themselves, are sufficient to render commandeering 
unconstitutional. Seventh and finally, a proponent of the Court’s 
anticommandeering doctrine might submit that this investigation 
ignores the tradeoff between rules and standards, assuming that the 
commandeering issue should be settled by a standard but neglecting 
the clarity of rules, particularly in federalist systems, which 
sometimes lack extensive state involvement in the national legislative 
process.  
The following sections address these criticisms in order. While 
some of the objections have more force than others, none of them 
ultimately undermines this inquiry’s claim that anticommandeering 
doctrine indefensibly ignores the doctrine’s impact on state regulatory 
control.   
A. Law or Politics? 
This functional analysis of anticommandeering doctrine will 
mean different things to different people, depending on their views 
concerning foundational questions of constitutional interpretation and 
the sources of constitutional law. For some, the level of state 
regulatory control encouraged by Supreme Court decisions qualifies as 
a jurisprudential argument.153 For others, however, it is merely a 
policy position the relevance of which is limited to the legislative 
process or to issues of constitutional design or amendment. The same 
could be said of the Court’s accountability concerns and the present 
inquiry’s consideration of financial burdens. 
To be clear, the presumption underlying this inquiry is not that 
issues of regulatory control, political accountability, and financial 
costs necessarily provide the relevant normative criteria by which to 
judge the constitutionality of federal legislation. In a given case, 
arguments grounded in these considerations could conflict with 
arguments based on the constitutional text, constitutional structure, 
Supreme Court precedent, the original understanding of the 
Constitution, American historical tradition, or an evolving national 
consensus on constitutional values. Rather, this investigation takes as 
a given the values that the Court’s various federalism opinions have 
identified as relevant to the practice of constitutional adjudication. 
Rather than imposing constitutional values, in other words, this 
 
 153. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 95, at 63 (“Why not at least consider the practical effects 
on local democratic self-government of decisions interpreting the Constitution’s principles of 
federalism—principles that themselves seek to further that very kind of government?”). 
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analysis assesses the extent to which anticommandeering doctrine 
tends to promote or to impede realization of the Court’s own stated 
values. Accordingly, this inquiry bears no burden of establishing the 
constitutional moment of the federalism values that it examines.154 
That said, a few observations on the status of state regulatory 
control as a value of constitutional moment are warranted to further 
defend the jurisprudential relevance of this analysis. This inquiry’s 
focus on regulatory autonomy is grounded in several sources of 
authority in American constitutional law. The Tenth Amendment 
speaks of “powers . . . reserved to the States,” which is a way of 
referencing the constitutional significance of state retention of 
regulatory authority. The text of the Tenth Amendment, moreover, 
articulates what other parts of the Constitution and the vertical 
constitutional structure presuppose and rely upon–that the federal 
government created by the Constitution will execute its 
responsibilities against the backdrop of states that generally may use 
their police powers to regulate public and private entities.155 Several 
key parts of the constitutional text and structure appear to express an 
underlying purpose to preserve and encourage state regulatory 
participation in the government of the nation.156 Similarly, many 
Supreme Court opinions and founding materials underscore the 
 
 154. As the vigorous debates between the majority and the dissent in New York and Printz 
suggest, arguments sounding in constitutional text, structure, precedent, originalism, and 
tradition have not decisively favored one side or the other in the Court’s Tenth Amendment 
cases. Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the Justices would underscore 
underlying federalism values. 
 155. For example, Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 authorizes Congress “[t]o provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be 
employed in the Service of the United States,” but “reserve[es] to the States respectively, the 
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress.” Similarly, Article I, Section 10 lists numerous activities in which states 
may not engage, such as “enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,” “coin Money,” or 
“emit Bills of Credit.” The implication is that the states would possess the authority to do these 
things in the absence of the textual prohibition. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 922-
923 (2006) (“[The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA)] manifests no intent to regulate the 
practice of medicine generally. The silence is understandable given the structure and limitations 
of federalism . . . . The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning 
medical profession regulated under the States’ police powers.”). 
 156. Cf. BREYER, supra note 95, at 115 (“Throughout, I have urged attention to purpose and 
consequences. My discussion sees individual constitutional provisions as embodying certain basic 
purposes, often expressed in highly general terms. It sees the Constitution itself as a single 
document designed to further certain basic general purposes as a whole. It argues that an 
understanding of, and a focus upon, those general purposes will help a judge better to 
understand and to apply specific provisions. And it identifies consequences as an important 
yardstick to measure a given interpretation’s faithfulness to these democratic purposes.”). 
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fundamental importance of state regulatory power to our 
constitutional system.157 
Finally, although intense disagreements have erupted at 
different points in American history over whether particular issues 
should be decided by the states or by the federal government (for 
example, racial issues), Americans have always almost universally 
accepted states as legitimate centers of significant regulatory power 
across a broad range of other issues (for example, the family, 
education, criminal law enforcement, and local land use in the absence 
of environmental harms).158 Accordingly, there is good reason to 
believe that the value of state regulatory autonomy is of constitutional 
significance and thus that anticommandeering doctrine’s impact on 
state autonomy is no mere “policy” concern better directed at 
Congress.  
B. Why the Litigation? 
The next objection seems straightforward: if this inquiry is 
correct, the Court fails to advance the interests of the states when it 
holds that commandeering violates the Tenth Amendment. But to the 
extent anticommandeering doctrine makes the states worse off, they 
should be able to figure out these perverse consequences on their own, 
and rational states would not press the Court to take the 
commandeering power away from the federal government. 
This objection, however, overlooks the distinction between the 
values of federalism and the political self-interest of state officials at a 
particular time. This analysis has been concerned with the former, not 
the latter. State officials may have an interest in challenging a 
particular instance of commandeering if they do not (or no longer) 
want to be bound by a federal regulation. They may have such an 
interest regardless of the long-run federalism costs or costs to other 
states,159 and despite their own expressed preferences before the 
 
 157. See, e.g., supra notes 88, 148 and accompanying text (quoting THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 
and various Supreme Court opinions). 
 158. This last statement refers not only to the constitutional authority of history and 
tradition, but also to the authority of the Constitution as ethos – as an evolving instantiation of 
American collective identity. See ROBERT C. POST, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 23-50 (1995) (arguing that 
constitutional interpretation is ineluctably responsive to contemporary conceptions of value). 
 159. Notably, some states sided with the federal government in Printz and New York. See 
Brief of the States of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 923 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503), 1996 WL 5950921; Brief of Respondents, 
States of Washington, Nevada and South Carolina, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992) (Nos. 91-543, 91-558, and 90-563), 1992 WL 526133. 
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federal regulation went into effect. This, of course, is what happened 
in New York.160 The petitioner state internalized more of the benefits 
of its successful constitutional challenge than it did the costs. Under 
these circumstances, it is no surprise that New York brought suit.  
This distinction between the values of federalism and the 
political self-interest of state officials at a particular time is critical 
and warrants further consideration. The foregoing analysis has 
argued that federalism values are compromised when states lose 
regulatory control, regardless of whether state officials are eager to 
cede regulatory authority to the federal government. The fact that 
state officials sometimes seek to relinquish regulatory power161 is 
largely beside the point within the context of this inquiry. The 
relevant normative question, rather, is what the constitutionally 
grounded values of federalism identify as the appropriate level of state 
regulatory control. Normatively, as opposed to descriptively, it would 
be odd for a federalism that values states as guardians against federal 
tyranny to countenance local avoidance of political responsibility as a 
benefit indirectly conferred by anticommandeering doctrine through 
an increase in preemption. 
From a constitutional perspective that values federalism, the 
optimal extent and form of federal regulation is ultimately a 
normative question of constitutional law, not a descriptive issue that 
turns on the political preferences of state officeholders. Constitutional 
law and economics, unlike other kinds of economic analysis, cannot 
take all preferences as given. Rather, a normative theory of value–
here, one supplied by federalism theory and doctrine–is necessary to 
determine which costs and benefits are admissible in a theoretical 
analysis of state autonomy.162 
 
 160. See supra Parts I and III. 
 161. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In 
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 797 (1995) (“[Federalism] is not always 
of value to state and local officials. To begin with, it is sometimes in the interest of state and 
local officials for them to pass the buck on the hardest problems of government by deferring to 
the folks in Washington, D.C.” (emphasis added)); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building 
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 941 (2005) (“[T]here is no logical 
relationship between the policy interests of state citizens and the amount of regulation flowing 
from the federal government or left to the states. Federal regulation and spending obviously can, 
and often does, benefit state-level constituencies. Consequently, state officials who are primarily 
interested in maximizing political support will have no reliable interest in decreasing federal 
power (or, the equivalent, in increasing state power).” (footnotes omitted)). 
 162. The preferences of state officials may be relevant, however, regarding questions of 
political accountability. See supra Part III (discussing New York). 
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C. Isn’t Preemption the Problem, Not Commandeering? 
This inquiry focuses on the choice between commandeering and 
its alternatives, particularly preemption, from a federalism 
perspective. The central claim is that anticommandeering doctrine 
does not serve federalism values when the Court’s application of the 
rule ultimately results in a greater number of preemptive responses, 
because preemption generally causes a greater compromise of 
federalism values than does commandeering. Relevant to this 
argument is the reality that the Rehnquist Court left preemption wide 
open as an alternative to commandeering. But what if that Court had 
not, or what if the Roberts Court changes course? One might respond 
to this inquiry by suggesting that the Court should strictly limit 
preemption in addition to maintaining anticommandeering doctrine in 
its current form. 
There is some force to this argument, but less than might at 
first appear. If preemption is “taken off the table,” so to speak, then so 
is much of the foregoing analysis of anticommandeering doctrine. But 
it is not clear how the Court could remove preemption as a 
constitutional alternative in many instances without radically 
transforming the constitutional regime in which we live. For example, 
the scope of the commerce power would have to be greatly restricted, 
or the Supremacy Clause would have to be fundamentally 
reinterpreted, to compel the conclusion that the New York Court erred 
in noting that preemption remained available to combat an interstate 
nuclear waste problem generated by commercial activity.163 
Granted, the Roberts Court could hold state and local laws 
preempted less often than the Rehnquist Court did. The Rehnquist 
Court’s apparent lack of concern for the impact of broad federal 
preemption on state regulatory control in the commandeering context 
is hardly sui generis. It is one of the puzzles of that Court’s legacy that 
the same Justices who wrote passionately about the virtues of 
federalism seemed somewhat tone deaf to the implications of broad 
federal preemption for the vindication of a substantive vision of state 
autonomy. The five Justices in the majority in critical cases involving 
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause164 or 
 
 163. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 164. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked 
authority under either the Commerce Clause or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 creating a private civil remedy for victims 
of gender-motivated violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating, for the 
first time since the New Deal, a federal statute regulating private conduct—the Gun Free School 
Zones Act of 1990—as beyond the commerce power). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
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Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment165 were often the most 
likely to hold state laws preempted.166 Professor Ernest Young has 
made this point repeatedly,167 as have other commentators of diverse 
 
(holding that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to prohibit the local cultivation and use 
of marijuana in states allowing such activity). 
 165. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of the 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits employment 
discrimination against the disabled, is beyond the scope of Section 5); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is 
beyond the scope of Section 5); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress could not lawfully 
abrogate state sovereign immunity from patent infringement suits because the provisions of the 
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 are beyond the scope of 
Section 5); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 is beyond the scope of Section 5). But see United States v. Georgia, 126 
S.Ct. 877 (2006) (holding unanimously that insofar as Title II of the ADA creates a private 
damages action against states for conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II 
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding 
that, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, 
Title II of the ADA constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power); Nev. Dep’t of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the family-care leave provision of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 as a valid exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power to combat 
unconstitutional sex discrimination). 
 166. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462 (2002) (observing that the Rehnquist Court 
held in favor of federal preemption in almost two-thirds of the then thirty-five preemption cases 
decided since Justice Thomas joined the Court); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial 
Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 369-70 (studying the Rehnquist Court’s voting alignments in 
eight non-unanimous preemption cases decided during the October 1999-2001 Terms; noting that 
“Justice Scalia voted to preempt in all eight, the Chief Justice and Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy in seven each, and Justice Thomas in six”; and further observing that “in those same 
eight cases, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer each voted to preempt only twice and Justice 
Stevens never voted to preempt”). 
 167. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 
1377-84 (2001) (observing that the Rehnquist Court’s allegedly state-rights majority often votes 
against the states in preemption cases); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the 
Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 39-40 (contending that the Court’s preemption 
decisions are significantly more important for state autonomy than are the rulings articulating a 
robust conception of state sovereign immunity). 
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ideological commitments.168 The Justices, however, apparently do not 
perceive any tension.169 
The suggestion that the Court should hold state law preempted 
less frequently, however, implicates questions of statutory 
construction, not constitutional law.170 When Congress makes clear its 
intent to preempt certain state and local laws, and when such 
preemptive action would otherwise fall within the commerce power, 
removing preemption as an option would be too bitter a pill to swallow 
even for most federalist Justices.171 It would also be difficult to justify 
disabling Congress from regulating interstate commercial matters,172 
particularly when the states are individually incompetent in light of 
collective action problems.173 
D. What about Conditional Non-Preemption? 
Another objection seizes upon the potentially attenuated 
nature of the link between the application of anticommandeering 
doctrine in a particular case and future instances of preemption. This 
 
 168. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different 
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004) (critiquing the Rehnquist Court’s 
preemption decisions for broadly interpreting federal law in favor of commercial interests and at 
the expense of progressive state regulatory measures); Fallon, supra note 166, at 471-72; Calvin 
Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 508 (2002) (“Given the 
broad range of issues over which Congress has undoubted power to regulate, the failure of the 
Court to apply preemption doctrine sparingly, and with real attention both to Congress’s intent 
and the values of federalism, will in the long run prove disastrous to perpetuation of the very 
real values underlying the diffusion of power inherent in federalism.”); Meltzer, supra note 166, 
at 362-78. 
 169. But see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 46 (2006) (questioning “the 
widespread impression of a sharp discontinuity between the Rehnquist Court’s ‘pro-state’ 
federalism decisions and its ‘nationalist’ preemption decisions”). 
 170. See supra note 17. 
 171. On the other hand, if one accepts the view that the Tenth Amendment imposes 
independent limits on congressional power (akin to other parts of the Bill of Rights), then certain 
hard-to-specify constitutional limits on preemption would seem to follow, at least when 
preemption imposes an extreme burden on the states. See supra notes 25-29, 36, 94 and 
accompanying text (discussing National League of Cities and Garcia). See also supra note 105 
and accompanying text (discussing the potentially onerous burden that federal preemption 
imposes on states). 
 172. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159-60 (“Space in radioactive waste 
disposal sites is frequently sold by residents of one State to residents of another. Regulation of 
the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is therefore well within Congress’ authority 
under the Commerce Clause. . . . Petitioners likewise do not dispute that under the Supremacy 
Clause Congress could, if it wished, preempt state radioactive waste regulation.”). 
 173. See supra notes 67, 140 and accompanying text (discussing the collective action problem 
implicated in New York); see also COOTER, supra note 90, at 103-07 (analyzing public goods and 
spillovers). 
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criticism argues that if the Court’s holding in New York raises 
concerns because of possible preemption going forward, then current 
doctrine is exactly right because the Court has banned 
commandeering while allowing Congress to offer states a choice 
between commandeering and preemption.174 This scheme can be 
denoted “conditional non-preemption” because Congress is 
conditioning its decision not to preempt state and local laws in a 
certain area upon the agreement of the states to be commandeered, 
which Congress lacks the power to do directly.175 With conditional 
non-preemption, preemption is certain to occur if commandeering does 
not. 
For example, statutes such as the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)176 
avoid the commandeering problem because they give states a choice. If 
states want to administer the clean air program in their states, they 
can prepare state implementation plans (“SIPs”) that meet federal 
minimum criteria. But if they do not, then the Act empowers the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to write a federal 
implementation plan (“FIP”) for such states.177 EPA has written 
several FIPs over the years, but few have gone into effect because the 
states ultimately have preferred to retain control over the 
implementation of the national standards.178 
 
 174. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (“[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate 
private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer States 
the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation. This arrangement, which has been termed ‘a program of 
cooperative federalism,’ is replicated in numerous federal statutory schemes.” (internal citations 
omitted)). For a description of this “cooperative federalism” model, see Adler, supra note 15, at 
384-87. 
 175. Conditional non-preemption is structurally analogous to conditional federal 
expenditures under the Spending Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. See supra notes 3, 51 and 
accompanying text; supra Part II.D (analyzing the conditional spending power from a federalism 
perspective). 
 176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2006). 
 177. For an able discussion of the “federal-state partnership” structure of the CAA, see 
Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1406-11 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also Adler, supra note 15, at 447-
48. 
 178. An interesting facet of the strategic posturing, however, is that EPA may be reluctant to 
impose FIPs because of the local anger generated when Washington, D.C. dictates such behavior 
as one’s personal driving and cooking habits. A FIP for ozone can govern such matters as local 
transportation and barbecue emissions. Personal Communication with Professor Jonathan 
Wiener, Duke University School of Law, in Durham, N.C. (January 24, 2006). This dimension of 
the problem suggests that the preemption alternative to SIPs is not truly automatic; EPA might 
hesitate before imposing a FIP. Yet perhaps a non-governmental organization (“NGO”) could 
eventually sue EPA to force it to adopt a FIP. In the longer term, after witnessing the angry 
feedback in response to the FIP, Congress might amend the CAA to remove or to dilute the FIP 
threat, thereby weakening the incentive of states to adopt SIPs. Thus, one could model this 
series of interactions as a multiperiod strategic game among several actors–the states, EPA, the 
NGO, and Congress. But this is a game for another day. 
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Thus, instead of allowing commandeering because of possible 
preemption later on if commandeering were prohibited, the Court has 
permitted commandeering only after Congress commits to preemptive 
action if the states decline to be commandeered. When the Court bans 
commandeering, preemption is merely possible. When the Court 
allows conditional non-preemption, preemption is assured if 
commandeering does not take place. The challenge for this inquiry is 
to explain why, from a federalism perspective, a regime allowing 
conditional non-preemption but not commandeering is less preferable 
than one that allows both. In any situation in which Congress is 
willing to regulate directly if it cannot commandeer because of an 
anticommandeering rule, it should also be willing to pass a 
conditionally non-preemptive statute. In any other situation, an 
anticommandeering rule cannot cause a greater amount of direct 
federal regulation going forward. 
From a federalism perspective, however, the choice that 
conditional non-preemption provides may not be preferable to the lack 
of choice that commandeering entails. In order to make a credible 
threat of preemption if the states refuse to be commandeered, 
Congress often must commit to putting federal “boots on the ground.” 
For example, the CAA’s conditional non-preemption provisions are 
effective only because EPA is able to step in if states refuse to enforce 
federal requirements.179 The existence of a federal administrative 
structure changes the federal-state balance in the relevant field for 
many of the same reasons that direct federal regulation does: federal 
administrators are present and making federal policy to some extent. 
And with the federal regime in place, more invasive federal 
regulations may be forthcoming.180 Accordingly, it may not be 
plausible to hypothesize a situation in which Congress credibly 
threatens preemption without imposing at least some direct 
regulation or agency oversight of states that has an impact similar to 
direct regulation. Commandeering is preferable to this type of 
oversight insofar as it affords states more flexibility to make policy 
choices.181 
 
 179. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. 
 180. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In the 
name of States’ rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create vast national 
bureaucracies to implement its policies.”); supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 181. The CAA experience strengthens the point that Printz is actually—and perhaps counter 
intuitively—a stronger case than New York from an anticommandeering perspective. See supra 
Part III. When the federal government is merely trying to get the states to do the leg work, a rule 
against commandeering might advance federalism values. By contrast, when a significant 
amount of discretion exists in executing a regulatory action (as there generally is under the 
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E. Is the Likelihood of Preemption High? 
The next objection is related to, but distinct from, the last one. 
This inquiry presents a story of counterintuitive results and perverse 
consequences only to the extent that the Court’s commandeering ban 
causes Congress to preempt state and local law more often than it 
otherwise would, thereby compromising federalism values to a greater 
extent than would commandeering. Skeptics might suggest that this 
story is possible but improbable because preemption of the kind that 
compromises federalism values is unlikely to result when the Court 
removes commandeering as a regulatory option. This may be so for at 
least two reasons. 
First, the distinction between commandeering and preemption 
from the standpoint of state autonomy is sometimes not clear-cut 
because not all types of preemption have the same impact on 
federalism values. It is one thing for Congress to preempt a field or to 
set a specific rule with which all regulated actors must comply. It is 
another for Congress to set a regulatory floor, above which states can 
regulate further if they choose. The latter type of preemption, like 
many instances of commandeering, allows states to retain some 
measure of regulatory control.182 
Second, if Congress would prefer to commandeer but cannot, 
then Congress’s second choice might not be preemption. Rather, its 
next-best alternative might entail regulating in a way conceptually 
and operationally more analogous to commandeering – such as using 
the conditional spending power or conditional non-preemption. If this 
is right, then anticommandeering doctrine does not significantly 
increase the probability of preemption going forward. For example, 
commandeering is often attractive when states possess an 
administrative capacity or infrastructure that the federal government 
lacks. Preemption, however, can be infeasible, at least in the short 
run, in regulatory situations involving large, fixed start-up costs. 
Moreover, heavy-handed federal preemption can be politically 
unpopular locally. It also requires a “boots on the ground” or “nation 
building” commitment from the federal government that may be 
lacking. The preemption “threat,” in other words, may not be credible. 
Members of Congress tend to talk about preempting state and local 
law more often than they do it.  
 
CAA), federalism values are often better secured through commandeering than through 
preemption. 
 182. See supra note 17. 
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Regarding the first point, it is true that preemption, like 
commandeering, can leave states a significant degree of regulatory 
control. But it is difficult to see how a given instance of preemption 
can offer states more regulatory control than a corresponding use of 
commandeering. With preemption, Congress wills not only the end but 
also the means. With commandeering, Congress wills just the end. If 
only one means is available to achieve the end, then commandeering 
and preemption affect state regulatory control to the same extent. 
Logically, however, it is not evident how preemption could offer states 
more regulatory control. In other words, it might happen that a 
particular use of commandeering leaves states with no more choices 
than would preemption, such as when both command the same 
behavior. But many situations exist when commandeering leaves 
states with more choices than would preemption, as in New York, 
while it is difficult to identify situations when preemption would allow 
states more choices than would commandeering. 
Regarding the second point, there were scores of preemption 
statutes in the United States Code, many more than there were 
instances of commandeering even before 1992, when New York was 
decided.183 In addition, preemption is not typically unpopular, nor is 
the federal will to preempt a rare political phenomenon.184 While the 
absence of a federal regulatory infrastructure may sometimes deter 
immediate preemptive action, this will not always be the case, and a 
commandeering ban gives Congress a greater incentive to put “boots 
on the ground” by building such an infrastructure.185 Moreover, states 
may not always agree to the conditions attached to federal funds, and 
conditional non-preemption also requires Congress to express the will 
to preempt. Finally, none of the above counterarguments suggest—let 
alone compel—the conclusion that the likelihood of preemption will 
usually be so trivial if Congress cannot commandeer that the Court 
has been justified in ignoring the question of state regulatory control. 
It is ultimately a context-sensitive empirical question whether 
applying the commandeering ban in a particular setting would cause 
the federal government to respond by engaging in preemption, using 
 
 183. Rather than 1992, the relevant time period may be the 1970s, when several (though not 
all) federal courts of appeals rejected commandeering imposed by EPA, and the federal 
government stopped the practice before the Supreme Court could decide the constitutional 
question. See Adler, supra note 15, at 423-24. 
 184. For example, after the Ninth Circuit invalidated the commandeering statute at issue in 
Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, see supra note 62, Congress responded with preemption. 
See Adler, supra note 15, at 425 (“Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Congress amended the 
[law] to require the Secretary of Commerce to issue federal regulations directly limiting the 
export of unprocessed logs.”). 
 185. See supra notes 127, 180 and accompanying text. 
  
1680 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:5:1629 
the conditional spending power or conditional non-preemption, or 
simply giving up and issuing no federal regulation. Sometimes 
preemption will be more likely, and sometimes it will be less likely for 
a variety of legal and political reasons. 
There are various ways one could try to investigate this issue 
both empirically and theoretically. Empirically, one could examine the 
universe of commandeering statutes and ask whether a preemption 
alternative would have been feasible, and if so, whether preemption 
would have been more effective than other regulatory approaches in 
light of the congressional priorities articulated in the statute and the 
legislative history. One could do the same for the much larger 
universe of preemption statutes in the United States Code—that is, 
ask whether there were feasible and comparatively effective 
commandeering alternatives available to Congress. Such an inquiry 
would require many contestable judgment calls regarding issues of 
feasibility and efficacy. 
Theoretically, one could inquire why Congress would ever want 
to commandeer. The answer to this question has important 
implications for the regulatory outcome that is most likely to occur if 
Congress cannot commandeer. To be sure, sometimes Congress will 
commandeer because only the states have the necessary people on the 
ground to carry out the federal mandate. At other times, however, the 
federal government commandeers instead of preempting because the 
states prefer commandeering and they impact the federal legislative 
process. At still other times, Congress may get “lazy” and choose one 
regulatory approach without thinking through the alternatives. 
Ultimately, however, this debate over the likelihood of 
preemption when commandeering is prohibited misses the intended 
contribution of this inquiry, which is primarily to advance a 
conceptual claim, not an empirical one. Because there often will exist 
a non-trivial chance that Congress will engage in preemption when it 
cannot commandeer, and because it is impossible for the Court to 
know at the time of judicial decision where a given case fits along the 
continuum of preemption probabilities, federalism doctrine requires a 
strategically sophisticated conceptual system, one that accounts for all 
of the regulatory possibilities before Congress. The basic error the 
Court has made, in other words, is that it has examined the 
accountability effects of commandeering without comparing 
commandeering to its alternatives and their effects on federalism 
values, which include but transcend accountability. If the Court made 
such a comparison, it would not insist upon a federalism doctrine in 
which commandeering is categorically barred, federal statutes are 
routinely construed to have broad preemptive effect, and Congress can 
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condition federal funding on state agreements to be commandeered 
even when the amount of money involved leaves the states no 
reasonable choice. 
Indeed, the “preemption is unlikely” objection to this critique of 
anticommandeering doctrine implicitly (if unwittingly) acknowledges 
that the Court’s defense of its doctrine is inadequate. The most 
persuasive argument in favor of New York and Printz is not that 
accountability concerns trump all other considerations.186 Rather, the 
argument is that commandeering raises serious accountability 
problems and imposes potentially significant financial costs on the 
states, and that a commandeering ban does not generate considerable, 
countervailing concerns about state retention of regulatory control 
(and accountability as well). For the reasons stated, this inquiry 
disagrees with this view. But the most important point is that the 
debate should center on a more complicated constitutional calculus 
than the accountability story told by the Court. 
F. Why Shouldn’t Accountability Trump? 
Those who find the Court’s accountability concerns 
compelling—perhaps even a constitutional “trump”—may be inclined 
to dismiss the foregoing analysis on the ground that accountability 
values are sufficient by themselves to render commandeering 
unconstitutional. This conclusion would be shortsighted for at least 
two reasons. 
First, as discussed in the Introduction and extensively by other 
commentators,187 it is not clear that political accountability is a 
constitutional value that the Justices are supposed to police in the 
service of federalism. The Tenth Amendment does not so instruct.188 
Nor is it apparent generally that commandeering generates 
insurmountable accountability concerns, or that preemption, 
conditional non-preemption, and conditional federal spending avoid 
similar accountability problems.189  
Second, no one value should be regarded as absolute in an area 
of constitutional law implicating inherent value pluralism. If a 
 
 186. Even when federalism values are reduced to accountability concerns, a ban on 
commandeering may be self-undermining. To the extent that anticommandeering doctrine 
results in greater use of the conditional spending power, for example, the doctrine generates 
potentially serious accountability problems. Unlike commandeering or preemption, conditional 
spending statues can present state voters with the false impression of a free choice to regulate in 
exchange for federal dollars. See supra note 14; Part II.D. 
 187. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 12-15, 186 and accompanying text. 
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particular federalism doctrine makes states worse off in terms of 
regulatory power forgone, the question arises whether the game is 
worth the candle. Federalists, in other words, have an interest in 
considering whether the accountability benefits alleged to be 
generated by current Tenth Amendment doctrine are cost-justified by 
exceeding the expected damage to state regulatory control caused by 
preemption. Federalists should also consider the relative financial 
costs imposed on the states by commandeering and its alternatives. 
The answer to this cost-benefit question is ultimately context-
sensitive, largely empirical, relatively unexamined, and therefore 
uncertain. Still, it is the most relevant inquiry to make if one is 
committed to more than a judicially administrable but largely 
symbolic gesture in the direction of federalism.190 That is, the cost-
benefit issue is the question to pose if one wants to determine the 
value of anticommandeering doctrine to the project of constitutional 
federalism.191 And lest this objection to the doctrine be deemed 
uncharitable or overstated, recall Justice Scalia’s chilling rigidity on 
 
 190. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 14, at 1007 (“[New York] is symbolism, nothing more; a 
line drawn in the sand for the sake of drawing a line.”); id. at 1088-89 (“The Court’s anti-
commandeering rule [is] best understood as a symbolic gesture—waving the banner of state 
sovereignty whether victory was here deserved or not.”); Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State 
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 200 (noting that “while 
[Printz] represents a decisive symbolic victory for state sovereignty, some would characterize its 
immediate practical impact as relatively minor”). Anticommandeering doctrine is relatively 
broad and deep, but its real-world effects have been quite modest in part because the federal 
government engaged in little commandeering even before 1992. See supra note 103; see also 
Caminker, supra, at 200, n.6 (noting that “there are only a handful of other recent 
commandeering statutes that clearly fall within the [Printz] decision’s ambit”); id. at 243 
(concluding that “Printz does not appear to curtail prior nationalist assertions of power in a 
significant manner”).  
 Regarding Printz in particular, the Brady Act’s interim provisions for background checks on 
firearm purchasers were scheduled to be replaced by a federal computer database as soon as it 
was ready to go online. The database is operational. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”), http://foia.fbi.gov/nics552g.htm 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (“The purpose of NICS, which was established pursuant to the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act), is to provide a means of checking available 
information to determine whether a person is disqualified from possessing a firearm under 
federal or state law.”). 
 The present, however, is not necessarily prelude to the future. The Roberts Court could use 
anticommandeering doctrine to invalidate other federal laws or executive actions, including 
those imposing reporting requirements that do not now clearly fall within the scope of the ban. 
See Caminker, supra note 190, at 200 n.6 (collecting various federal laws that require state 
officials to gather and report information to federal authorities). The Printz Court stated that it 
was not deciding whether reporting requirements fall within the ban on commandeering. See 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923, 917-18 (1997); see also id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). In a post-9/11 world, moreover, it is uncertain what the future may bring in the 
realm of commandeering. See infra Part V. 
 191. Cf. Caminker, supra note 14, at 1007 (calling for the Court to “engage in a more serious 
and sophisticated inquiry into the role that federalism values ought to play in our polity today”). 
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behalf of the Court in Printz: “It is the very principle of separate state 
sovereignty that [commandeering] offends, and no comparative 
assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental 
defect.”192 While it is black letter law that the Constitution allows 
facial distinctions on the basis of race if the state interest is 
sufficiently weighty,193 the Rehnquist Court allowed no such balancing 
in the context of commandeering. Accountability concerns do not 
justify the Court’s categorical rule. 
G. Why Not Prefer Rules over Standards? 
One might agree with the theoretical suggestion that the 
values animating anticommandeering doctrine need not have uniform 
bite in all contexts, yet nonetheless conclude as a practical matter that 
the Court’s categorical rule is sound. On this view, much of the 
difference between this inquiry’s balancing argument and the holding 
in New York concerns the distinction between a rule and a standard. 
In the particular circumstances of New York, perhaps federalism 
values would have been better served by allowing commandeering, yet 
this suggestion just assumes the conclusion that the question should 
be settled by a legal standard requiring case-by-case application. The 
choice between bright-line rules and flexible standards implicates a 
famously complicated jurisprudential and ideological controversy, one 
that is closely related to the debate in constitutional law between 
categorization and balancing.194 In the commandeering context, the 
clarity of rules may be especially protective of federalism values when, 
in contrast to Europe, states tend to be less involved in the 
formulation of the federal law that would commandeer.195 
Putting aside the questionable assumption that greater state 
involvement in the formulation of federal policy means greater 
 
 192. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932. See id. at 935 (“[N]o case-by-case weighing of the burdens or 
benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional 
system of dual sovereignty.”). See also Young, supra note 72, at 127 (“The anticommandeering 
doctrine is . . . . the hardest of rules, apparently recognizing no exceptions for even the clearest of 
statements or the weightiest of federal interests.”); Caminker, supra note 190, at 200 (“The Court 
[in Printz] announced a categorical anti-commandeering rule, one not subject to any case-by-case 
balancing of interests or measurement of burden.”). 
 193. For the Court’s most recent pronouncement, see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 
505 (2005). 
 194. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987); Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1991). Cf. Neil 
S. Siegel, A Prescription for Perilous Times, 93 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1645, 1663-66 (2005) 
(discussing the rules-versus-standards debate in the context of wartime threats to civil liberties). 
 195. See supra Part II.E. 
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protection of federalism values,196 the problem with this defense of 
anticommandeering doctrine is that the Court’s rule is so over- and 
under- inclusive with respect to the purpose of safeguarding 
federalism values as to be vulnerable to the charge of arbitrariness. 
The anticommandeering ban is over-inclusive because one can readily 
imagine instances of commandeering that advance, rather than 
thwart, federalism values—for example, the facts of New York. At the 
same time, the rule is under-inclusive because it does not account for 
other regulatory alternatives, particularly preemption, that can 
impose truly awful consequences by stripping states of regulatory 
control and generating a complex picture of accountability. 
Conditional federal spending, moreover, can offer states no reasonable 
choice, raising both accountability and regulatory-control concerns.197 
One can persuasively argue for a rule over a standard in certain 
situations, but one cannot plausibly suggest that any rule will do. 
More aggressive use of preemption after New York would illustrate 
the general phenomenon that rules, which lack the chilling effect 
imposed by standards, may free strategic actors to pursue counter-
purposive advantage right up to the line demarcated by the rule.198 
Indeed, the Court’s constitutionally decisive classification of a 
federal regulation as commandeering, preemption, conditional non-
preemption, or conditional spending is normatively empty. In general, 
federal laws falling into any of these categories can safeguard or 
undermine federalism values. Sound legal doctrine requires a 
functional analysis of a federal law’s impact on constitutionally 
relevant federalism values, not a bright-line distinction that judges all 
instances of commandeering out of bounds but interprets invasive 
federal regulations to have broad preemptive effect. 
V. COMMANDEERING AFTER 9/11 
An illustration other than New York and Printz is useful to 
show how the analysis defended in this inquiry is preferable to the 
Court’s categorical approach to commandeering. The example, briefly 
referenced in the Introduction, will also serve to illuminate how the 
Court should handle the relevant issues going forward. 
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 generally prohibits U.S. 
military personnel from directly participating in law enforcement 
activities within the United States—for example, interdictions, 
 
 196. See supra Part IV.B. 
 197. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
 198. See KELMAN, supra note 194, at 41; Kennedy, supra note 194, at 1773–74; Sullivan, 
supra note 194, at 63. 
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surveillance, searches, seizures, and arrests on behalf of civilian law 
enforcement authorities—except when expressly authorized by the 
Constitution or Congress.199 Congress has provided for several 
exceptions to the Act.200 
Presumably, Congress could amend the Posse Comitatus Act to 
specify that under defined conditions in the wake of a terrorist attack, 
the United States military would have exclusive authority to maintain 
law and order within the affected area.201 There might need to be 
 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air 
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”). The original 1878 Posse Comitatus Act (“PCA” or 
“Act”) referred only to the United States Army. The Air Force was added in 1956. The Act’s 
prohibitions were extended to all the services with the enactment of 10 U.S.C. § 375, which 
directed the Secretary of Defense to 
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including 
the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any 
personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a 
member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or 
other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is 
otherwise authorized by law. 
10 U.S.C. § 375 (2006). The Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defense Directive 5525.5. 
See United States Northern Command Fact Sheet, Posse Comitatus Act, 
http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.factsheets&factsheet=5 (last visited Dec. 
25, 2005). For background and analysis, see generally Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse 
Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding 
Before Any More Damage is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV. 86 (2003); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the 
Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383 
(2003); Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatuts Act: A Principle in Need of 
Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 953 (1997).  
 200. These include statutes that: (1) authorize U.S. military personnel to provide 
counterdrug assistance, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-381 (2006); (2) allow the President to use U.S. military 
personnel at the request of a state legislature or governor to suppress insurrections, 10 U.S.C. §§ 
331-335 (2006); (3) permit Department of Defense personnel to assist the Department of Justice 
in enforcing prohibitions regarding nuclear materials, when the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Defense jointly determine that an “emergency situation” exists posing a serious 
threat to U.S. interests beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement agencies, 18 U.S.C. § 
831 (2006); and (4) allow Department of Defense personnel to assist the Department of Justice in 
enforcing prohibitions regarding biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction, when the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine that an “emergency situation” 
exists posing a serious threat to U.S. interests beyond the capability of civilian law enforcement 
agencies, 10 U.S.C. § 382 (2006). 
 201. The President arguably possesses inherent Article II authority to use the military in 
such situations, as long as he acts in the absence of a congressional prohibition. Cf. Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the President has independent 
power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not 
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his 
powers.”); Beth Nolan et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, 53 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 42, 43 
(Feb. 9, 2006) (“To say that the President has inherent authority does not mean that his 
authority is exclusive, or that his conduct is not subject to statutory regulations enacted . . . 
pursuant to Congress’s Article I powers.”). Even when Congress has not acted, there are limits to 
the President’s inherent authority. As held in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the 
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other limits (time, for example) to make the law clearly constitutional, 
but that is just fine tuning. So, what if Congress decides not to replace 
state and local law enforcement personnel with the military, but 
instead chooses to put state and local officers under federal command 
(with federal pay) for the duration of the emergency conditions? 
If New York and Printz mean what they say, Congress would 
be prohibited from placing state and local officers under federal 
control; the authorizing legislation would fall within the Court’s 
prohibition of commandeering.202 Under current Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, however, and putting aside other constitutional 
considerations and the wisdom of the choice, there would be no 
constitutional impediment to Congress’ authorizing the military to 
maintain law and order within the area targeted by the terrorist 
attack until the emergency had passed.203 
 
President may not substitute military courts for civilian courts in geographic areas of the country 
where civilian courts are functioning, unless Congress suspends the writ of habeas corpus. 
 202. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 190, at 243 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 923, 
940 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice Stevens is surely correct to observe that a 
commandeering power might still be extremely important to protect national interests in an 
emergency.”). Justice Stevens authored these “prescient” words, Althouse, supra note 76, at 
1233, more than four years before September 11, 2001: 
Indeed, since the ultimate issue is one of power, we must consider its implications in 
times of national emergency. Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the 
administration of a military draft, the mass inoculation of children to forestall an 
epidemic, or perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national 
response before federal personnel can be made available to respond. If the 
Constitution empowers Congress and the President to make an appropriate response, 
is there anything in the Tenth Amendment, “in historical understanding and practice, 
in the structure of the Constitution, [or] in the jurisprudence of this Court,” ante, at 
2370, that forbids the enlistment of state officers to make that response effective? 
More narrowly, what basis is there in any of those sources for concluding that it is the 
Members of this Court, rather than the elected representatives of the people, who 
should determine whether the Constitution contains the unwritten rule that the 
Court announces today? 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Althouse, supra note 76, at 1235, 1266-68 
(asking whether the needs of the federal government in fighting terrorism may cause the Court 
to articulate a national-security exception to anticommandeering doctrine, but arguing that the 
“doctrine should be preserved in its absolute form not only in spite of the war on terrorism, but 
precisely because it can protect individual rights that the exigencies of war may lead courts to 
narrowly construe”). 
 203. Congress’s power to enact legislation dealing with external threats to national security 
finds several textual justifications in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which contains a 
number of military-related powers. They include the spending power in clause 1, which expressly 
refers to “the common Defence,” and the necessary and proper power in clause 18, which grants 
Congress the authority to carry into effect the President’s powers in this area as well. That said, 
the Constitution’s independent limits apply generally to these congressional powers, although 
not necessarily in the same way. Accordingly, if National League of Cities were revived, see supra 
notes 24-29, 36, 94 and accompanying text, its holding might create problems for a preemption 
statute of the sort hypothesized in the text. 
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It is questionable whether this constitutional delineation of 
Congress’s freedom of action is sound from a federalism perspective. 
According to the Rehnquist Court, criminal law enforcement is a 
traditional subject of state concern,204 an area regarding which our 
federal system historically has preserved a significant degree of state 
regulatory control. Yet the impermissible commandeering option is the 
one that leaves room for state regulatory control if Congress allows 
deputized state officers to exercise discretion (which they inevitably 
would have to exercise in any event). By contrast, the permissible 
preemptive alternative allows no room for a state role in maintaining 
law and order.205 Moreover, financial considerations do not weigh 
against the commandeering option because the legislation specifies 
that the mandate would be funded entirely by the federal 
government.206 Finally, accountability concerns may be real when 
state officers act under federal command yet also exercise discretion, 
but a priori they do not seem sufficient to justify what would 
otherwise be a perverse situation from a federalism perspective. If 
anything can capture the attention of most Americans and impress 
upon them who is ultimately in charge, it is a national tragedy like the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Moreover, government at every level 
and the news media could clarify to citizens on the ground when state 
and local law enforcement personnel were acting in a federal 
capacity.207 
One could construct other examples to make the same point. 
Various federal responses to a natural disaster come to mind, 
 
 204. See supra note 164 (discussing Lopez and Morrison). The Morrison Court stated that 
“the suppression of [violent crime] has always been the prime object of the States’ police power.” 
529 U.S. at 615. The Lopez Court stressed that “[u]nder the theories that the Government 
presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in 
areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been 
sovereign.” 514 U.S. at 564. 
 205. Cf. BREYER, supra note 95, at 60 (referencing Justice Stevens’ Printz dissent and asking 
rhetorically whether the “freedom to enlist state officials [would] not help to advance both the 
cause of national security and the cause of cooperative federalism”). 
 206. The commandeering might trigger some opportunity-cost concerns, however, if state 
and local law enforcement priorities were sacrificed during the time when the federal law placed 
the state and local officers under federal command. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 207. This commandeering analysis is likely not affected by the constitutional provisions 
allowing Congress to call forth and govern the state militias, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16. By 
firmly established historical understanding and legal practice, state and local law enforcement 
personnel are not included within the militia. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison). Nor would Article IV, 
Section 4 appear to affect the constitutional inquiry. It provides that the United States “shall 
protect each [State] against Invasion.” This mandate would not allow otherwise prohibited 
commandeering when the federal government can use the United States Armed Forces to protect 
the states from invasion and thus need not commandeer local law enforcement officers. 
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particularly in light of the inadequate federal, state, and local 
reactions to Hurricane Katrina.208 If constitutional doctrine is 
supposed to vindicate federalism values in reality and not just 
symbolically, then the Court should train its attention not only on 
political accountability, but also on state retention of regulatory 
control and the financial impact of different regulatory regimes on 
state budgets. A federalism jurisprudence that does so will deem the 
Rehnquist Court’s categorical ban on commandeering seriously over 
and under inclusive with respect to the values of federalism. By 
reformulating the doctrine along the lines of an ex ante standard 
enforced through case-by-case balancing, the Court would be well 
positioned to conduct a functional analysis of different instances of 
commandeering, paying particular attention to the feasibility of 
preemption in various future situations were commandeering 
prohibited. 
To reiterate, legal standards and balancing tests carry their 
own jurisprudential risks. They can be difficult to administer, and 
they can confer too much discretion upon lower courts and the Justices 
themselves in future cases. But as the foregoing analysis implicitly 
suggests, some relatively clear and administrable guidelines are 
available, even in the abstract. Instances of commandeering should 
carry a presumption of unconstitutionality when preemption is not a 
feasible alternative in the short run,209 the federal mandate is 
unfunded and expensive, and the federal government makes little 
effective effort to alleviate reasonable accountability concerns. Only a 
substantial governmental interest should be sufficient to overcome 
this presumption.210 By contrast, commandeering should be held 
constitutional as far as the Tenth Amendment is concerned when 
preemption is a feasible alternative in the short run and such 
 
 208. See, e.g., Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at A1 (“Federal Emergency Management Agency officials expected the 
state and city to direct their own efforts and ask for help as needed. Leaders in Louisiana and 
New Orleans, though, were so overwhelmed by the scale of the storm that they were not only 
unable to manage the crisis, but they were not always exactly sure what they needed. While local 
officials assumed that Washington would provide rapid and considerable aid, federal officials, 
weighing legalities and logistics, proceeded at a deliberate pace.”). 
 209. Courts would have to make a judgment about how likely federal preemption is over 
what realistic period of time. Sometimes Congress would have an opportunity to preempt 
relatively quickly. Other times Congress would need a new federal regulatory infrastructure that 
would require a significant amount of time to establish. The longer it would take for Congress to 
act, the more speculative the action would become.  
 210. This article has examined the issue of commandeering from the standpoint of values 
commonly thought to be advanced by federalism. An optimal commandeering doctrine must also 
take into account the interests of the federal government. This part of the doctrinal test would 
require courts to assess the strength of the national interest in commandeering. 
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preemption would reduce state regulatory control relative to the 
commandeering at issue, the federal mandate is fully funded or 
inexpensive to carry out, and the federal government takes effective 
measures to maintain lines of accountability (or accountability is for 
some other reason not seriously threatened). More difficult situations 
arise when the above factors cut in opposite directions. The Court 
would need to address them through the inductive common law 
method that characterizes the practice of constitutional 
adjudication.211 If the Court were to adopt this approach, Congress 
would be well-advised to legislate with the above considerations in 
mind so as to avoid confronting the Court with hard commandeering 
cases. 
According to the above criteria, New York was decided 
incorrectly on balance. Although the federal mandate was expensive 
for the states to carry out, preemption was a plausible alternative that 
also would have imposed significant costs on states,212 and 
accountability was not seriously threatened because the states should 
have been held accountable for the commandeering sanction they 
approved. Therefore, the Court should have permitted commandeering 
in New York. Printz, by contrast, is a closer case and is more 
defensible than New York from a federalism perspective. On the one 
hand, the federal mandate was inexpensive and local law enforcement 
officers could have explained to would-be firearms purchasers that 
federal law mandated background checks. On the other hand, the 
federal government made little effort to alleviate accountability 
concerns in enacting the law, and preemption was not a plausible 
alternative in the short run. In terms of the likely impact on 
federalism values, therefore, the Court’s prohibition of 
commandeering in Printz was less problematic than it was in New 
York. 
One might reiterate the objection that courts are not 
institutionally competent to implement such a multi-factored analysis, 
and that one benefit of the current doctrine is that it is clear, simple 
for courts to apply, and easy for the federal government to work 
around in developing federal policies. This criticism, however, proves 
too much. Flat prohibitions are the extraordinary exception in 
constitutional law, even though they are clearer, simpler, and easier to 
work with than rules or standards that tolerate exceptions and 
sensitivity to value conflict. The Tenth Amendment inquiry 
 
 211. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 877 (1996). 
 212. See supra text following note 144. 
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recommended above seems less institutionally demanding and open-
ended than many modes of analysis that govern distinct areas of 
constitutional doctrine, including federalism.213 
CONCLUSION 
Anticommandeering doctrine is seriously over- and under- 
inclusive, whether considered in light of federalism values as a whole, 
or in light of the accountability concerns on which the Court has 
inappropriately fixated. As has been mentioned in passing throughout 
this inquiry,214 such a disconnect between legal doctrine and 
animating values suggests that the Rehnquist Court’s Tenth 
Amendment legacy has more to do with judicially manageable 
symbolism than with the substance of federalism.215 
The legal universe is in flux, however, and the Rehnquist Court 
is no more. The Roberts Court will decide over the coming years and 
decades whether the Constitution is concerned primarily with the 
symbolism of federalism or with its substance.216 The answer to this 
question will determine, among other things, whether the Court will 
insist on applying anticommandeering doctrine of New York and 
Printz no matter what—that is, even when there exists a serious 
 
 213. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Commerce Clause); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987) (conditional Spending Clause); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (procedural due 
process). 
 214. See supra notes 19, 143, 190 and accompanying text. 
 215. The triumph of symbolism over substance is also evidenced by the Court’s apparent lack 
of concern to limit or overrule Garcia and to rehabilitate National League of Cities. See supra 
Part I (discussing National League of Cities and Garcia). This triumph is further illustrated by 
the Court’s invigoration of state sovereign immunity in the name of state sovereign “dignity.” See 
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threat to national security or other critical national interests are at 
stake; when Congress is determined to regulate one way or another; 
when our federal system has an abiding interest in maintaining state 
regulatory control; when there exists no reasonable possibility of voter 
confusion implicating accountability concerns; and when the financial 
costs to the states involved are trivial. If the Roberts Court applies 
anticommandeering doctrine even in these circumstances—which the 
Rehnquist Court insisted is the Constitution’s command—then 
defenders of state autonomy should join advocates of national power in 
dissent and emphatically reject the flattery. 
 
